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INTRODUCTION 
 
The moral category of justice is granted particular privilege in contemporary ethical 
discourse. As one of the foundational concepts used to describe desirable circumstances within 
human relations the category of justice carries a certain prestige that renders it useful in almost 
any domain of interpersonal interaction. The concept of “justice” has enjoyed this privilege for 
centuries and emerges out of a profound and complex history that imbues it with a symbolic 
value that is powerful enough to steer political campaigns, inspire theologies of orthopraxy, 
mobilize revolutions, inspire heroic acts of selflessness, and to coax even the most parsimonious 
soul into acts of generosity and parity. However, also arising from the profound and complex 
history is an equally complex set of differing definitions, conceptualization, and faculties granted 
to the moral category in order to meet specific needs in society. These competing 
conceptualizations of justice can cause confusion and hinder productive dialogue unless the 
differences are clearly understood. This is especially true in the realm of social justice. 
One of the most important contemporary issues within the Society of Jesus is the way in 
which contemporary evangelization impacts social evolution and social structures.  Under the 
umbrella term of “social justice,” the Society is committed to analyzing and changing social and 
economic structures that impact human lives so that the values of the Gospel can be actualized 
within the human family.  Understanding what St. Thomas Aquinas has to say about the issues 
involved in social justice is important for two reasons.  First, the theological and ethical language 
of the Society, and the Catholic Church in general, draws deeply from the Thomistic tradition. 
Many of the categories and much of the language used to discuss ethical and political issues are 
drawn from Aquinas’ theory.  Therefore, understanding our traditional formulations and our 
patrimony of ethical reasoning requires an understanding of his theory.  
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Second, the tradition of social justice grew in the Society of Jesus out of the natural law 
theory fashioned by Aquinas.  The landscape formed by social justice objective, the horizon of 
possibilities established thereupon, and the mode of operation therein were all initially derived 
from the natural law and virtue theory.  Although the contemporary commitment to social justice 
has evolved beyond a strict adherence to Aquinas’ theory, and it has assimilated sundry 
philosophical and political values, methods, and principles along the way, it remains deeply 
connected to the view of the human person expressed in Aquinas’ virtue theory.  The 
commitment to social justice lights up with greater intelligibility when it is placed in proximity 
to Aquinas’ theory. 
Third, there is a vigorous resurgence of attempts to reappropriate Aquinas’ ethical theory 
according to contemporary sensibilities, because his treatment of the human agent as a deeply 
contextualized and organically related person is very attractive. The theory of virtue ethics, 
which he adapted from Aristotle, promises to help ethicists navigate out of many of the rocky 
waters produced by deontological methods or by philosophical perspectives that treat the agent 
as acting from a place of Cartesian isolation. The recontextualization of the human agent within a 
robust and organic account of human experience, the fluid and dynamic perspective of the 
virtues, and the rational principles outlined in natural law theory all serve as points of interest in 
contemporary ethics, especially for Roman Catholic ethicists. Therefore, understanding how to 
move forward and engage current ethical theories is also assisted by an astute grasp of Aquinas’ 
ethics.  
Understanding the ethical heritage of the Society of Jesus and Catholic theology in 
general, as well as engaging with the contemporary appropriations of natural law and virtue 
ethics, requires an understanding of Aquinas’ ethical theory.  If one is dedicated to the 
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constellation of issues described as the “promotion of social justice” within a Catholic context, 
then it is helpful to understand how these issues fit into Aquinas’ overall system.  One will only 
be frustrated if one looks narrowly to Aquinas’ theory of iustitia (justice) to find the theoretical 
framework upon which a commitment to social justice can stand.  For Aquinas, the purview of 
the virtue of iustitia is limited to the will, and it simply does not possess the rational faculties 
necessary to accomplish the analysis that is essential to contemporary social justice.  For all 
those interested in promoting social justice within a Catholic framework it is important to 
understand how social justice issues relate to Aquinas’ theological project.  The constellation of 
issues commonly referred to as the promotion of social justice includes: 1) the acceptance of a 
radical equality for all human persons and a protection of the rights of individuals in relationship 
to various subgroups or the overall society; 2) a critique of social and economic structures such 
that there can be an equal access to goods, services, and opportunities for all people; and 3) a 
commitment to the preferential option for the poor.  While we consider these criteria necessary 
for promoting social justice we are using the term “justice” in a manner that is quite different 
from Aquinas.  To understand how Aquinas’ ethical theory can be applied to contemporary 
social justice one must recognize how the term “justice” has changed through time and how, 
through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a new hybrid virtue arose that dominates 
contemporary American usage.  
One must also realize that, although Aquinas does provide a theoretical framework in 
which the issues of social justice can be addressed, he does so employing a different rubric. 
Because of the limitations he places on iustitia, many of the issues associated with social justice 
belong under the care of other Thomistic virtues.  The contemporary convictions of radical 
equality and individual rights belong to the Thomistic domain of theoretical reasoning through 
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wisdom. The critique of social structures according to contemporary economic theories and 
sensibilities belongs to the Thomistic domain of practical reasoning through prudence. The 
commitment to the preferential option for the poor belongs to the Thomistic virtue of charity. In 
Aquinas’ language, the faith that acts with justice—if justice is understood as social justice—is 
more accurately a faith that acts prudently. To demonstrate how this is the case I will first 
elucidate how Aquinas envisions the human person acting, how he relates the faculties of 
intellect and will, and how these are perfected by the virtues of charity, wisdom, prudence, and 
justice.  I will also demonstrate how to map the concerns of social justice onto Aquinas’ virtues, 
and finally I will give examples of contemporary ethical theorists who are implicitly using the 
mapping scheme I propose. 
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CHAPTER 1   THE HUMAN ACT WITHIN AQUINAS’ ETHICS 
 
1.1 Intentional becoming and human flourishing 
 
Aquinas’ ethical theory, drawing deeply from the embracive, systematic philosophy of 
Aristotle, attempts to account for every aspect of the human act.  Following Aristotle, he founded 
his ethics not upon a philosophy of law but upon a metaphysics of being.1  Aquinas envisions 
people as creatures, intimately situated in a specific social and environmental framework, and 
drawn towards the goals that attract them.  Properly human actions, or moral actions, are the 
voluntary movements towards a goal that is perceived as good.  These goods can be simple, 
concrete objects presented to the senses—like food or clean water—or complicated, abstract 
objects whose presentation is necessarily mediated by an act of the intellect—such as social 
constructs, concepts of happiness, or God.  Aquinas not only agrees with Aristotle that all things 
seek their proper good, but expands the domain of goods to include all of created reality.  It is 
within this dynamic of all things seeking their proper good that Aquinas’ analysis of human acts 
is located.  According to Aquinas, people move toward that which perfects and fulfills them 
according to their nature and according to their proper place within the domain of goods.  
Aquinas understands the process of human maturation as one of natural development. 
Any particular instance of human flourishing, or happiness, is not given from the start but is a 
goal towards which we are supposed to deliberately move.  The human agent is endowed with 
the faculties necessary for the recognition of the necessary goods for happiness and must develop 
the habits of mind and will that help them attain these goods.  For people to act ethically, and to 
move towards happiness, they must have a sufficient intellectual grasp of what human life is 
                                                
1 Fr. Daniel Westberg notes: “This is not a disjunction, however, since the harmony of law and human action is 
achieved in the doctrine of participation in the mind of God, who governs the universe with wisdom and love.”  
Westberg, 43.  Westberg graduated with a DPhil in moral theology and ethics from Oxford University.  He currently 
teaches ethics and moral theology at Nashotah House Theological Seminary in Nashotah, Wisconsin. 
Page 8 
supposed to be, what flourishing looks like, and have a rightly ordered will such that they desire 
this proper end.   
1.2 The intellect and the will 
 
In order to provide a theoretical framework in which each of these stages of intentional 
becoming can be understood, and according to which any specific act may be scrutinized and 
discussed, Aquinas employed a precisely defined set of distinctions with respect to human 
psychology.  Aquinas emphasizes that the healthy human person acts as a single, whole unit, and 
not with competing faculties that cause a schizophrenic duplicity or multiplicity in the self; 
however, his conviction that realities that are external to the human person present themselves in 
a variety of ways, and with a variety of effects upon the person, prompts him to elucidate distinct 
“faculties” of the soul according to the external object.  In his discussion of the pursuit of 
happiness, Aquinas employs the distinction between intellect and will.  He was very clear that 
the intellect and will work closely together, and indeed include each other, he believes that the 
difference in the way that the two faculties interact with their objects warrants the distinction.  
Indeed, the broader presuppositions of Aquinas’ metaphysics require and underwrite his 
description of the division of the intellect and will.  In his analysis of Aquinas’ metaphysics of 
agency Daniel Westberg warns that if the broader metaphysical presuppositions that give rise to 
the distinction between intellect and will are played down or ignored then “the explanation of the 
motivation for action will inevitably make false turns.”2  In order to avoid such false turns it is 
necessary to situate the intellect and will within the broader context of Aquinas’ metaphysics. 
According to Aquinas, the taxonomic difference between intellect and will is primarily 
derivative of the difference between their objects.   He states, “The appetitive and intellectual 
powers are different genera of powers in the soul, by reason of the different formalities of their 
                                                
2 Westberg, 43. 
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objects.”3  The primary object of the intellect is truth and the primary object of the will is the 
apparent good.4  The will is dependent upon the intellect for the determination of the goodness 
of objects, especially the less concrete the object is.  Aquinas states, “The object of the intellect 
is the very character of the attractive good, while the object of the will is the attractive good 
thing, the rationale of which is in the intellect.”5  Aquinas defends the metaphysical priority of 
the object of the intellect over those of the will by demonstrating that the objects of the intellect 
are metaphysically simpler, i.e. not compounded, and more universal: “The object of the intellect 
is more simple and more absolute than the object of the will; since the object of the intellect is 
the very idea of appetible good; and the appetible good, the idea of which is in the intellect, is the 
object of the will.”6  This metaphysical priority of the intellect over the will holds for the 
determination of the good intrinsic to any object presented to the will, no matter how concrete.  
Even the simple determination of the gastronomic desirability of a familiar berry is dependent 
upon an action of the intellect.  As the complexity and compoundedness of an object increases, 
this dependence becomes even more acute. 
Aquinas continues by stating that the taxonomical differences between the intellect and 
the will are not only dependent upon the differences of the objects to which they are oriented, but 
also to the mode of operation they employ in relation to their objects.  Since the mode of 
operation deals more with the psychological unity of the agent, Aquinas begins his discussion of 
the modes of operation by emphasizing the interconnection and interdependence of the powers of 
the soul, “…the appetitive power agrees partly with the intellectual power and partly with the 
                                                
3 ST, I, Q79, Art. 3. 
4 Westberg, 54. 
5 ST, I, Q82, Art. 3.  See also: Westberg, 55. 
6 Ibid. 
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sensitive power in its mode of operation.” 7  Having restated the psychological unity of the agent, 
Aquinas then places an external source of the differentiation of the powers of intellect and will 
by relating each to its act.  Aquinas states that a power is related to its act, so that the nature of a 
power is taken from the act to which it is directed.8  To further explain the acts of the intellect 
and will, he provides an analogy in which he relates the acts of each to the metaphysics of 
motion.  He elucidates: 
A thing is said to move in two ways: First, as an end; for instance, when we say that the 
end moves the agent.  In this way the intellect moves the will, because the good 
understood is the object of the will, and moves it as an end.  Secondly, a thing is said to 
move as an agent, as what alters moves what is altered, and what impels moves what is 
impelled.  In this way the will moves the intellect, and all the powers of the soul.9 
 
The agent is moved towards some course of action through a combination of the intellect and the 
will.  The will is a moved mover.  As the rational appetite it moves the intellect to investigate 
and judge the goods of the environment and it moves the agent to choose among these goods.  
However, the intellect is also a mover in that it determines the “intellectively cognized 
appetibles”10 that form the domain of goods chosen by the will.  That is, the intellect must act in 
order to elucidate the nature of the good according to its ends.  By itself the will makes no 
determinations of goodness.  Apprehending or judging things as good is, as Aquinas scholar 
Eleanor Stump of St. Louis University says, the “business of the intellect.”  She indicates that the 
intellect presents to the will as good “certain things or actions under certain descriptions in 
particular circumstances,” and the will wills them because “it is an appetite for the good and they 
are presented to it as good.”11   
                                                
7 ST, I, Q79, Art. 3. 
8 ST, I, Q77, Art. 3. 
9 ST, I, Q82, Art. 5. 
10 Stump, 278. 
11 Ibid. 
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 Aquinas emphasizes the metaphysical priority of the intellect in his discussion of how the 
intellect and the will guide an agent towards the state of relative fulfillment translated as 
“happiness.”  Because happiness is dependent upon the correct discernment of both means and 
ends, the intellect is primarily responsible for attaining it: 
Two things are needed for happiness: one, which is the essence of happiness: the other … 
[is] the delight connected with it.  I say, then, that as to the very essence of happiness, it 
is impossible for it to consist in an act of the will.  For it is evident from what has been 
said12 that happiness is the attainment of the last end.  But the attainment of the end does 
not consist in the very act of the will.  For at first we desire to attain an intelligible end; 
we attain it, through its being made present to us by an act of the intellect; and then the 
delighted will rests in the end when attained.  So, therefore, the essence of happiness 
consists in an act of the intellect: but the delight that results from happiness pertains to 
the will.13 
 
According to Aquinas, the intellectual appetite for the good moves the intellectual apprehension 
to investigate our nature and to form principles of understanding by which we can know how to 
move towards the end that our nature suggests.  The intellect makes use of reasoning to move 
along a line of investigation until various goods are determined that are consistent or necessary 
for attaining our end of happiness.14  The intellect then presents a possible course of action that 
will facilitate movement towards the end.  The job of a well-ordered will is to choose both the 
ends and the means presented by the intellect, and to delight in the state of affairs as much as it 
contains the happiness according to our last end.  The more complicated the good, the higher 
degree of interaction there must be between the intellect and the will.  If something were 
presented to a well-ordered will as perfectly good, the will would necessarily be drawn to it. 
However, many if not most of the higher-order goods necessary for human happiness, including 
the whole realm of social interaction, are never presented as absolutely good with no 
                                                
12 ST, I-II, Q2, Art. 7.  
13 ST, I-II, Q3, Art. 4. 
14 ST, I, Q79, Art. 7.  “Reasoning is a mode of the intellect through which one moves from one understood thing to 
another.”   
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qualification, but are presented to the will as something pluriform and complex which does not 
necessarily determine the will.15 
 The high degree of interaction between the intellect and the will gives rise to concerns 
about their relative temporal priority and the ordering of operations in decision making.  Indeed, 
in his commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Aquinas states that Aristotle is vulnerable 
to charges of circularity of logic.  He states that for Aristotle the “truth of the practical intellect is 
determined by comparison with a right appetitive faculty and the rectitude of the appetitive 
faculty is determined by the fact that it agrees with right reason.”16  However, Aquinas breaks 
this circularity in two ways.  First, he simply declares that the intellect enjoys both metaphysical 
and temporal priority: “Every act of the will requires that cognition precede it, but a motion of 
the will does not precede every act of cognition.”17  Secondly, he breaks the circle open by 
referring to a point of reference external to the self; that is, he states that the ends to which the 
appetitive faculty tends are determined by nature.   Understanding this invention of Aquinas 
requires a closer investigation of his theory of the operation of the intellect.  
1.3 Theoretical and practical reasoning 
 
 Aquinas states that the action of the intellect, i.e. reasoning, can be understood as having 
two different aspects, or as working in two different ways.  The first way he calls theoretical 
reasoning and the second he calls practical reasoning.  Theoretical reasoning is concerned with 
the comprehension of natures, forms, and principles.  It is, therefore, abstract and speculative.  
Theoretical reasoning investigates the issues surrounding human flourishing.  It is responsible for 
apprehending our human nature, articulating the principles that flow from said nature, and 
relating our nature to the social and environmental structures in which we live.  In short, 
                                                
15 ST, I, Q82, Art. 2, ad 1. Also see: Westberg, 55. 
16 Aquinas, Commentary on NE, Book VI, Chapter 2, Lecture II, §1131, pg. 360. 
17 ST, I, Q82, Art. 4, ad 3. 
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theoretical reasoning applies to the entire intellectual analysis of what it means to be human and 
to the logical conclusions that can be drawn from such analysis.  Theoretical reasoning 
concerning human nature gives rise to a conceptual articulation of what human flourishing and 
happiness look like according to the final ends of the human person.  Since the human person is a 
social, embodied, and situated creature, the articulation of theoretical reasoning as pertains to 
human nature necessarily includes definitions of the ideal states of various human interpersonal 
relationships, relationships to various external goods, and other issues surrounding the human 
situation.  The conceptual analysis and investigation of the functions of state, family, matrimony, 
and economy, for example, is in principle the proper domain of theoretical reasoning. 
Practical reasoning is the process by which the means of attaining the goods associated 
with happiness are determined and presented to the will.  The human person has a natural 
aptitude for discerning the means and ends to which they are related by connaturality; however, 
practical reasoning is also concerned with applying the conclusions and conceptual articulations 
of theoretical reasoning to specific situations.  Practical reasoning, when applied to the issues 
surrounding human flourishing, is responsible for ascertaining the means by which the ends, as 
articulated by theoretical reasoning, can best be achieved.  It is focused on practical concerns and 
operates within the sphere of the “real world” of experience, finitude, and limitation.  Practical 
reasoning makes judgments about what sort of actions should be taken, according to the 
circumstances, towards the intended goal.  Again, since the human person is a social, embodied, 
and situated creature, the articulation of practical reasoning as applied to specific situations 
necessarily includes specific means of organizing and practically living within the various human 
interpersonal relationships, relationships to various external goods, and other issues surrounding 
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the human situation.  The practical day-to-day functioning of the relationships of state, family, 
matrimony, economy, etc., is the proper domain of practical reasoning. 
1.4 The functions of synderesis and conscience 
 
It is in relation to a virtue specific to the functioning of practical reasoning that 
Aristotle’s chicken-and-egg problem with respect to the functions of the intellect and will is 
further resolved.  For Aquinas, practical reasoning begins with general principles immediately 
recognized by the intellect as true.  These principles are comprehended according to the virtue of 
synderesis, which is a disposition of the intellect such that it can grasp fundamental principles of 
human action.  Aquinas makes an analogy between the principles grasped through synderesis and 
those elucidated earlier in the Summa regarding speculative knowledge, “in the practical reason, 
certain things pre-exist, as naturally known principles, and such are the ends of the moral virtues, 
since the end is in practical matters what principles are in speculative matters.”18  Just as in the 
case of first principles of speculative reasoning, the principles of action grasped by synderesis 
are not a priori knowledge contained in the soul, but basic principles of action arrived at by 
experience and informed by multiple external points of reference through the habit of synderesis.   
Although Aquinas does not develop the concept of synderesis as much as one might hope 
in the Summa, he does develop the analogy between practical and theoretical reasoning in the 
Disputed Questions: “Thus, just as there is a natural habit of the human soul through which it 
knows principles of the speculative sciences, which we call understanding of principles, so, too, 
there is in the soul a natural habit of first principles of action, which are the universal principles 
of the natural law. This habit pertains to synderesis.”19  As natural reason investigates the human 
condition, and delineates the characteristics necessary for human flourishing, it is able to deduce 
                                                
18 ST, II-II, Q47, Art. 6. 
19 QDV, Q16, Art. 1.  
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primary principles of action that are necessary for any motion towards those goals.  The overall 
functioning of human reason with respect to the characteristics of human flourishing and the 
means necessary to get there is defined as the natural law.  Aquinas does not expound on the 
content of the first principles because, instead of providing a base set of legal instructions, or 
deontological demands, he places the moral agents in direct contact with their immediate 
experience and describes the habit through which the basic moral precepts are derived.  This 
connection between the agent and creation, through which the reason of the creator is made 
manifest, defines the basic dynamics of his natural law theory.  Aquinas explains the relatively 
limited scope of the set of primary principles grasped through synderesis and how they form the 
basis of the natural law: 
Consequently the first principle in the practical reason is one founded on the notion of 
good, viz., that good is that which all things seek after.  Hence this is the first precept of 
law, that good is to be done and pursued, and evil to be avoided.  All other precepts of 
the natural law are based upon this: so that whatever the practical reason naturally 
apprehends as man’s good (or evil) belongs to the precepts of the natural law as 
something to be done or avoided.20 
 
It is through this connection of practical reasoning, acting through the virtue of synderesis, that 
Aquinas makes the other chicken-and-egg eliminating proposition.  Not only does he state that 
the intellect has metaphysical and temporal priority over the action of the will, but he also 
endows practical reasoning with the habit of synderesis through which the intellect is able to 
draw immediate and trustworthy principles of action from the most basic human experiences.  
This dynamic relationship of the agent to his or her experience opens the circle of causation by 
including points of reference outside of the agent.  Through the investigation of human nature, as 
presented through experience, the intellect is able to form an image of what human flourishing 
looks like, and thereby to appoint the end to the moral virtues—the goal towards which all moral 
                                                
20 ST, I-II, Q94, Art. 2. 
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actions should be moving.  Therefore, Aquinas explains, “natural reason, known by the name 
synderesis, appoints the end to moral virtues.”21   
Interestingly, according to Aquinas, when practical reasoning operates through the virtue 
of synderesis it produces principles of action that are reliably true.  Aquinas relates the 
dependability of practical reasoning operating through the virtue of synderesis to the certain 
knowledge that can be attained through speculative reasoning:   
Consequently, all changeable things are reduced to some first unchangeable thing.  
Hence, too, it is that all speculative knowledge is derived from some most certain 
knowledge concerning which there can be no error.  This is the knowledge of the first 
general principles, in reference to which everything else which is known is examined and 
by reason of which every truth is approved and every falsehood rejected.  If any error 
could take place in these, there would be no certainty in the whole of the knowledge 
which follows. As a result, for probity to be possible in human actions, there must be 
some permanent principle which has unwavering integrity, in reference to which all 
human works are examined, so that the permanent principle will resist all evil and assent 
to all good.  This is synderesis, whose task it is to warn against evil and incline to good.  
Therefore, we agree that there can be no error in it.22 
 
Since Aquinas does not accept inerrancy in human action, it can be deduced that the scope of 
such principles is quite limited.  It can be very difficult, in a post-Kantian world in which an 
agent’s actions are analyzed with a semi-Cartesian isolation, to recognize that Aquinas’ goal is 
not to underwrite a set of laws, duties, or instructions that can guide human action, but to define 
and describe the organic relationship of the agent with his full environment—in which one can 
act with reliable efficacy in matters both theoretical and practical. 
If practical reasoning, operating through the habit of synderesis, is able to produce 
dependable principles of action, and one presumes that the agent will be naturally inclined 
towards the good, then how does Aquinas account for errors and corruption in human action?  To 
understand error in human action it is helpful to consider Aquinas’ definition of conscience and 
                                                
21 ST, II-II, Q47, Art. 6, ad 1. 
22 QDV, Q16, Art. 2. 
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how conscience functions within his system.  According to him, there are two primary functions 
of conscience.  The first being an active function and the second being a reflective function.  As 
for the active function of conscience, once a course of potential means of action are selected 
through practical reasoning, the moral agent exercises conscience whereby moral conclusions are 
drawn about the relative goodness or badness of the act in question.  Conscience is not a moral 
virtue, nor an additional power of the soul, but simply the judgment an agent may come to 
concerning a specific act, in light of various rational concerns of practical reasoning.  Aquinas 
defines: “For the name conscience means the application of knowledge to something.  Hence, to 
be conscious (conscire) means to know together (simul scire).  But any knowledge can be 
applied to a thing.  Hence, conscience cannot denote a special habit or power, but designates the 
act itself, which is the application of any habit or of any knowledge to some particular act.”23  
For Aquinas, the act of conscience presumes that the full contingent of faculties and powers of 
the agent be functioning and that it be operating under the influence of the full constellation of 
habits.  Conscience is the full bringing to bear of the resources with which the agent is endowed 
upon some potential course of action in order to prod, urge, or bind the agent with respect to a 
specific decision.24  
Conscience also has another function in Aquinas’ system, one that bears more 
relationship to the colloquial use of the phrase in American employment.25  Aquinas states that 
conscience also has a reflective function through which it retrospectively declares the goodness 
or badness of a previous action, based on current knowledge and reasoning.  When conscience is 
acting in this reflective mode, it “is said to accuse or cause remorse, when that which has been 
                                                
23 QDV, Q17, Art. 1.  See also ST, I, Q79, Art. 13. 
24 QDV, Q17, Art. 1.   
25 When I speak of American usage I could broaden the scope to include British usage; and when I speak of 
American philosophical and political thought I could expand to include much of European culture. 
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done is found to be out of harmony with the knowledge according to which it is examined; or to 
defend or excuse, when that which has been done is found to have proceeded according to the 
form of the knowledge.”26  Through this reflective feature of conscience one is able to bring new 
information, new experience, or broader consideration to bear on an action that has already taken 
place. 
The need for a reflective mode of conscience, whereby an agent can revisit a previous 
decision and include additional elements for consideration, or investigate the truth values of the 
information upon which the decision was made, indicates the limitations of human consideration 
and betrays the primary sites for error in human decision making.  The exercise of conscience 
and the practical application of reasoning to a specific situation are vulnerable to error in both the 
active and reflective modes.  Aquinas asserts, “conscience is nothing but the application of 
knowledge to some special act.  Error, however, can occur in this application in two ways; in 
one, because that which is applied has error within it, and, in the other, because the application is 
faulty.” 27  The two sources of error in human action are accounted for in one of two ways.  
Either conscience acts upon a set of knowledge and presuppositions that are, in fact, in error; or 
the agent’s application of conscience is simply in error—as would be the case in some temporary 
or permanent deficit of the intellect.   
According to Aquinas, one must act according to the dictates of conscience; that is, 
according to what is judged as good and right, even if the judgment is faulty because of inept or 
ineffective reasoning.  In fact, it would be a moral evil for a well-ordered will to act against 
reason even if that reason is faulty.  Aquinas concludes, “absolutely speaking, every will at 
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variance with reason, whether right or erring, is always evil.”28 This absolute dependence of the 
will upon proper reasoning emphasizes the importance of his system of virtues by which the 
intellect, and therefore reasoning, can be improved or perfected.  Aquinas assigns three virtues 
that attend and perfect theoretical reasoning and two that relate to practical reasoning.  The 
virtues that deal with theoretical reasoning are wisdom, understanding, and science.  The virtues 
that attend and perfect practical reasoning are art and prudence. 
                                                
28 ST, I-II, Q19, A5. 
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CHAPTER 2  HOW THE VIRTUES OPERATE WITHIN AQUINAS’ ETHICS 
One of the aspects of Aquinas’ ethical system that is very attractive to some 
contemporary theorists is that it involves a careful dissection of the human act in general, apart 
from the positive content of any specific legal system.  Any specific human act is not treated in 
isolation; therefore, it is understood as an act within a specific legal system, and influenced by 
the positive content of that system, but the essential characteristics of ethical human behavior are 
discussed within the theoretical framework established by the virtues and not laws or rules.  One 
of the reasons that the virtue approach to ethical reasoning is attracting much attention today is 
because it frames ethical discourse within the context of the interplay of various habits of the 
person, and then analyzes how the habits relate to the external realities.  This approach proffers 
an ethical theory that is more highly transportable between groups with differing cultural, legal, 
religious, and sociological presuppositions.  The architecture upon which Aquinas builds his 
ethical theory is not based on laws or rules of any kind.  On the contrary, building upon the same 
structural elements of Aristotle’s theory, Aquinas constructs his ethical theory around his 
account of the virtues.  In her tome on Aquinas, Eleonore Stump states that even in describing 
and analyzing the virtues, Aquinas “devotes very little space to rules which codify those virtues 
or prescribe the way a virtuous person would act.  He devotes much more attention to explicating 
the relation among ethical dispositions, including the ordered relations among certain virtues or 
certain vices and the ordered opposition of particular virtues and vices.”29  According to 
Aquinas, the virtues are the dispositions, abilities, tendencies, or capacities that direct the actions 
of human persons such that they might achieve their goals.  They are habits that contribute to our 
flourishing, or to our functioning to our best advantage, so that our needs as human people are 
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satisfied.30  Although Aquinas admits of both good and bad habits—dispositions that help and 
hinder our attaining satisfaction as people—he defines the constellation of helpful habits as 
virtues.  He defines virtue as “a habit (habitus) which is always for the good.”31 
As we have already seen, Aquinas provides a taxonomy through which he employs 
distinctions within the active powers driving human activity.  The primary distinction he uses 
with regard to the psychological powers is that between the intellect and the will, each being a 
power that is defined by the object to which it is attuned: the intellect being attuned to truth and 
the will being attuned to the attainment of intellectively cognized appetibles.  The end of a power 
is its act, and the complexity of a truly human act—that is, a rational act—is such that it requires 
a number of attending virtues to assist the intellect and the will in attaining their goal of human 
flourishing.32  According to Aquinas, virtue is a “perfection of a power.”33  The virtues are the 
habits of character by which these powers are made efficient and effective at reaching the 
relative and absolute goals of happiness or blessedness.  The presumed psychological unity and 
environmental embeddedness of the agent, the interpenetration of the powers, and the 
interconnectedness of the virtues in Aquinas’ system make the radical isolation or elevation of 
one virtue of the agent above the others impossible and unprofitable; nevertheless, as stated in 
the previous chapter, when Aquinas is outlining his theoretical psychology he gives both 
temporal and metaphysical priority to the action of the intellect.  When he begins his discussion 
of the virtues he reiterates this priority: 
Accordingly for a man to do a good deed, it is requisite not only that his reason be well 
disposed by means of a habit of intellectual virtue; but also that his appetite be well 
disposed by means of a habit of moral virtue.  And so moral differs from intellectual 
virtue, even as the appetite differs from the reason.  Hence just as the appetite is the 
                                                
30 For more see: Davies, 239. 
31 ST, I-II, Q55, Art 1. 
32 Ibid., corpus. 
33 Ibid. 
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principle of human acts, in so far as it partakes of reason, so are moral habits to be 
considered virtues in so far as they are in conformity with reason.34 
 
In the same way that the goods that are sought by the will require intellectual warrant, the virtues 
that attend the will are dependent upon the action of reason for their proper functioning.  
Understanding how the virtue theory of Aquinas can be best appropriated as a basis for a 
contemporary ethical system that includes a robust commitment to the issues commonly referred 
to as social justice requires a careful investigation of the virtues that operate in the social realm, 
with special emphasis being given to the virtues that function upon the intellect and reason. 
2.1  The virtue of charity 
 
Given the metaphysical and temporal priority that Aquinas states of the action of the 
intellect, it might seem surprising that, in the IIa IIae, he defines the central virtue that acts upon 
and perfects the intellect’s theoretical reasoning, the gift of wisdom, as a subcategory to his 
discussion of charity, which is a virtue that acts upon the will of the agent.  However, if one 
considers the architecture of Aquinas’ virtue theory, and its relationship to his overall theological 
project, his reasoning comes into view.  Aquinas agrees, in general, with Aristotle’s account of 
the acquisition of virtue.35  Aristotle presents a “bottom up” experiential program in which an 
individual begins by acquiring the virtues that govern the attaining of physical necessities, then 
moves to exercising the virtues that enable profitable social involvement, continues through to 
the virtues necessary for the contemplation of practical and philosophic wisdom, and arrives 
finally to the contemplation of the good, or of God as the highest good.  In the Nicomachean 
Ethics, when Aristotle is contemplating the relationship of the highest good to the relative good 
of human flourishing, he wonders:  
                                                
34 ST, I-II, Q58, Art. 2. 
35 As is evident in the similar taxonomy Aquinas uses, in the Ia IIae when he first introduces the virtues in general. 
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If anything is the gift of the gods to men it is reasonable to think that happiness, the best 
by far of all human goods, is the gift of God…on the other hand, if happiness is not sent 
directly by God, but comes to men by virtue and study and exercise, it would still be 
judged most divine.  As the reward and end of virtue it is apparently most excellent and 
divine and blessed.36   
 
When Aquinas is commenting on this passage he indicates: “A thing is not called divine only 
because it comes from God but also because it makes us like God in goodness.”37  Aquinas is 
partially resolving Aristotle’s perplexity by providing that both elements are true: God is active 
in providing the gift of happiness to humanity, by providing both the relative and absolute goods 
of human experience, and God is active in the process by which we gain the necessary virtues to 
assist in our journey to enter into that happiness.   
When Aristotle continues this line of query in Book Ten, he states: “certainly what 
pertains to nature is not in our power but comes from some divine cause to a man who is very 
fortunate.  However, discourse and instruction are not effective with everyone but the soul of the 
hearer must be prepared by good habits to rejoice in the good and hate the evil.”38  When 
Aquinas comments on this passage he concludes: “because rectitude of the appetitive faculty is 
needed there must be habituation inclining this faculty to good.”39  There must be a virtue by 
which the human appetite is initially habituated towards seeking the good; a virtue through 
which God entices the intellect to contemplate the highest and relative good, and by which God, 
for whom there is no distinction between intellect and will, directly governs human intellect.40 
                                                
36 Aristotle, NE, Book I, Chapter 9, (1099b9-1100a5).  “εἰ µὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλο τί ἐστι θεῶν δώρηµα ἀνθρώποις, 
εὔλογον καὶ τὴν εὐδαιµονίαν θεόσδοτον εἶναι, καὶ µάλιστα τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ὅσῳ βέλτιστον. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο µὲν ἴσως 
ἄλλης ἂν εἴη σκέψεως οἰκειότερον, φαίνεται δὲ κἂν εἰ µὴ θεόπεµπτός ἐστιν ἀλλὰ δι᾽ ἀρετὴν καί τινα µάθησιν ἢ 
ἄσκησιν παραγίνεται, τῶν θειοτάτων εἶναι: τὸ γὰρ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἆθλον καὶ τέλος ἄριστον εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ θεῖόν τι 
καὶ µακάριον.” 
37 Aquinas, Commentary on NE, Book I, Chapter 9, Lecture XIV, §169,  pg. 56. 
38 Aristotle, NE, Book 10, Chapter 9, (1179a33-1180a24).  “δεῖ δὴ τὸ ἦθος προϋπάρχειν πως οἰκεῖον τῆς ἀρετῆς, 
στέργον τὸ καλὸν καὶ δυσχεραῖνον τὸ αἰσχρόν.”  One can easily imagine Aristotle’s disappointment with the virtue 
of his most famous student as an example of this conundrum.   
39 Aquinas, Commentary on NE, Book X, Chapter 9, Lecture XIV, §2144, pg. 640. 
40 Ibid., §2145, pg. 640. 
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Seizing on these points in Aristotle’s account of the virtues, Aquinas makes his most 
profound departures from Aristotle’s virtue theory.  First of all, when Aquinas structures his 
account of the virtues in the expanded ethical theory found in the IIa IIae, he deliberately inverts 
the order of the virtues from that which Aristotle provided.41  Secondly, he builds the system 
under the primary category of charity.  Aquinas’ architecture of the virtues does not follow 
Aristotle’s didactic expression of the order of experience, but rather the ontological expression of 
the order of causation.  Aquinas presents the virtues from a “top down” perspective in which 
God, as the final and ultimate cause, moves the human person to seek the good.  This good is, in 
an absolute sense, God himself.  The good also has a relative sense represented in natural human 
good and flourishing.  Drawn by these goods the human person gains the virtue of prudence, 
which orders their practical judgment; followed by justice, which orders their relationship to 
human society; and finally gains the virtues that include such things as magnanimity.42  
Aquinas’ decision to structure his theory of the virtues upon a theocentric, ontological 
hierarchy as opposed to an anthropocentric, pedagogical model might seem to contradict the 
previously stated emphasis on the metaphysical and temporal priority of the intellect over the 
will; however, the agent-side psychology, with priority given to the intellect, remains intact 
while the agent is considered within the context of a relationship to goodness, truth, and God.  
Aquinas agrees with Aristotle who, towards the end of the Metaphysics, states, “The final cause, 
then, produces motion as being loved, but all other things move by being moved.”43  Aquinas 
thus defines the virtue of charity as the primary and primordial virtue.  He defines human charity 
                                                
41 Aristotle, in the NE, structures his virtues as follows: courage & temperance, liberality, magnanimity, amiability, 
justice, prudence, wisdom, friendship, highest good.  In his treatment of the virtues the IIa IIae Aquinas inverts this 
order: Love of God, charity as friendship with God, extension of charity to others, wisdom, prudence, justice, 
liberality, magnanimity, courage & temperance.  With the exception of liberality, this is a perfect inversion. 
42 I got this idea initially from: Keys, 198, footnote #22. 
43 Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book XII, Chapter 7, (1072b4), pg. 879.  “κινεῖ δὴ ὡς ἐρώµενον, κινούµενα δὲ τἆλλα 
κινεῖ.” 
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as a participation in the divine love.44  In distinction to Aristotle, Aquinas places the dynamism 
of love at the beginning of his discussion of the virtues as opposed to the end. 
One of the benefits of this structure is that it provides a basis for agent-side psychological 
integration.  Aquinas protects the integral unity of powers of the soul, whose distinctions are 
defined through their objects, by following the order of causation, and beginning his account of 
the powers and their respective objects, with the philosophically simplest of objects.  The 
psychological unity of the agent is established by the ultimate unity of God who is the source and 
goal of all that is good.  This prevents the potential centrifugal effects that can arise from 
considering the objects of the powers of the soul in their experiential order.  The order of 
causation provides the centripetal force of love as the source of all being, motion, potential, and 
unity.  Love serves as the basis of the initial motion of both the will and the intellect.  In his 
treatise on the theological virtue of charity Eberhard Schockenhoff, a priest and professor of 
moral theology, states, “Because the final end is present in everything one does, one’s actions 
gain their unity and inner coherence only in the measure that they succeed in uncovering this 
final end, to affirm it consciously, and to accept it in free decisiveness.”45   
The second benefit that flows out of Aquinas’ architecture of the virtues is that it defines 
another external point of reference that grounds and supports human experience and reasoning.  
Similar to his theory of the function of synderesis, this provides an external point of reference 
that helps to ground human experience and virtue.  The human participation in divine love, 
known as charity, connects the agent to the external reality of God acting in and through human 
experience.  Obviously, Aquinas’ vision of God was significantly different from Aristotle’s 
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Page 26 
relatively sterile vision of “thought thinking on itself.”46  But Aquinas moves well beyond 
Aristotle’s more dynamic and active vision: “We say therefore that God is a living being, eternal, 
most good, so that life and duration continuous and eternal belong to God, for this is God.”47  
Based on the content of Christian revelation, Aquinas understands God to be love.  Aquinas 
states that the highest good and true end of human life is friendship with the personal God.  This 
move is not entirely exogenous to Aristotle’s thinking, and there are distinct points of contact 
between what Aquinas is suggesting and what Aristotle was investigating in the metaphysics; 
however, Aquinas incorporates some of the theological content of Christian revelation into 
Aristotle’s speculation and makes this new synthesis, with explicit God-side interpersonal 
initiative, the heart of his ethical theory.  He postulates two ends in human life: the relative and 
limited happiness attainable by virtuous persons functioning in human society through their own 
natural resources; and the absolute and perfect happiness of union with God and others in the 
beatific vision attainable through God’s grace.48  According to Aquinas, the virtues outlined by 
Aristotle prove generally adequate to achieve natural happiness.  If there was no possibility of 
perfect bliss in union with God, and no higher measure of truth than human reason, then 
Aristotle’s virtue theory presented in the Nicomachean Ethics would be a sufficient guide to the 
moral life.49   
 However, since there is a state of blessedness that surpasses the natural happiness 
attainable through natural means, there must be a virtue that allows for this new object to be 
                                                
46 Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book XII, Chapter 7, (1072b20), pg. 880.  “αὑτὸν δὲ νοεῖ ὁ νοῦς” 
47 Ibid., (1072b28-30), pg. 880.  “φαµὲν δὴ τὸν θεὸν εἶναι ζῷον ἀΐδιον ἄριστον, ὥστε ζωὴ καὶ αἰὼν συνεχὴς καὶ 
ἀΐδιος ὑπάρχει τῷ θεῷ: τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ θεός.” 
48 ST, II-II, Q23, Art. 1, ad 1.  ST, II-II, Q23, Art. 7 “Accordingly just as the end is twofold, the last end, and the 
proximate end, so also, is good twofold, one, the ultimate and universal good, the other proximate and particular.”  
“Sicut ergo duplex est finis, unus ultimus et alius proximus, ita etiam est duplex bonum, unum quidem ultimum, et 
aliud proximum et particulare.” 
49 For more on this see: Kent, 124. 
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attainable.  For Aquinas, charity is a virtue that exceeds our natural resources and draws the will 
and intellect into union with God.  Aquinas addresses how charity functions in relation to reason: 
Human acts are good according as they are regulated by their due rule and measure.  
Wherefore human virtue which is the principle of all man’s good acts consists in 
following the rule of human acts, which is twofold: human reason and God.  
Consequently just as moral virtue is defined as being in accord with right reason, as 
stated in Ethic. ii. 6, so too, the nature of virtue consists in attaining God…Wherefore, it 
follows that charity is a virtue, for, since charity attains God, it unites us to God.”50 
 
Charity is the virtue by which the human agent is in relationship to God.  Therefore, it is through 
charity that our human experiences are established in relationship to ultimate reality, eternal 
destiny, and common creatureliness.  Charity not only allows us to intend God as an object of 
our will and intellect; but it also is the power through which we are made aware of this 
possibility, drawn to this possibility, and realize this possibility.  Charity is the human 
participation in divine love such that the human person is drawn into the interpersonal dynamics 
of the Triune God.  Schockenhoff declares that God “out of unbounded love for his Triune 
nature, and in a movement in response to this original event of love, draws all creatures in accord 
with their own dignity back to Himself as end.”51  In this way, the interpersonal dynamics of love 
and charity that we experience with other people become incorporated into the very nature of 
God, and seen as a participation in the inner life of God. 
 Because God’s existence is not immediately knowable by us, and because God’s inner 
life would be utterly inaccessible without some kind of communication, we are not able to arrive 
at this kind of charity through our own natural endowments.  Aquinas concludes, “Therefore it is 
most necessary that, for us to perform the act of charity, there should be in us some habitual form 
superadded to the natural power, inclining that power to the act of charity, and causing it to act 
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with ease and pleasure.”52  In Aquinas’ system, charity is a virtue that is given to the human 
person as a gift of grace.  The process by which God endows the human person with such a 
powerful gift is beyond the scope of this thesis; however, the two ways Aquinas describes this 
process are that it is a superaddition to the natural powers through a kind of infusion.53  In both 
cases the idea is clear that the virtue of charity is not something that is within the natural 
capability of a human person apart from God’s direct action.  The exogenous nature of divine 
love accomplishes two important things in preserving Aquinas’ ethical system.  First, it provides 
for the means by which the human person can intend God as an object of the intellect and will 
that do not violate the agent-side psychology already stated.  Second, it grounds human 
experience and virtue in an ultimate, transcendent, personal reality that has been communicated 
by God. 
God freely has chosen to communicate the divine inner life within the course of human 
history, through divine revelation.  It is through this process of divine revelation, with the 
accompanying gift of grace, that the human person enters into a true friendship with God.  Since 
there is a communication between man and God, inasmuch as God communicates divine 
happiness to us, some kind of friendship must be based on this communication.  Aquinas defines, 
“The love which is based on this communication, is charity: wherefore it is evident that charity is 
the friendship of man for God.”54  By defining the human relationship to God as one of 
friendship, Aquinas has returned to a classical category employed by Aristotle; however, he has 
                                                
52 ST, II-II, Q23, Art. 2.  “Unde maxime necesse est quod ad actum caritatis existat in nobis aliqua habitualis forma 
superaddita potentiae naturali, inclinans ipsam ad caritatis actum, et faciens eam prompte et delectabiliter operari.” 
53 ST, II-II, Q63, Pro.  “Deinde considerandum est de causa virtutum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum 
virtus sit in nobis a natura. Secundo, utrum aliqua virtus causetur in nobis ex assuetudine operum. Tertio, utrum 
aliquae virtutes morales sint in nobis per infusionem.”  It is well beyond the scope of this thesis to address the 
fascinating issues surrounding Aquinas’ theory of infusion of virtue.  I would not be surprised if, upon investigation, 
it turns out that the normative economy by which virtue is infused in the person is through participating in the life of 
the Church, especially its sacramental system.  Although I would suspect that Aquinas would provide for the 
possibility of an extraordinary economy of grace as well. 
54 ST, II-II, Q23, Art. 1, corpus.  
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elevated this natural category to the highest dignity possible and endowed it with the very 
essence of true human fulfillment and happiness.  This elevated form of friendship defines and 
qualifies the category as it is used in any other sense.  All human friendship and love are 
qualified and informed by this more fundamental category of human friendship with God.  
Aquinas articulates how our other loves relate to our love of God: “Therefore God ought to be 
loved chiefly and before all (principaliter et maxime) out of charity: for He is loved as the cause 
of happiness, whereas our neighbor is loved as receiving together with us a share of happiness 
from Him.”55  This, again, is not an indication of temporal or didactic priority; that is, we do not 
developmentally enter into a relationship with God and then, by extension, enter into 
relationships with other people.  This is a metaphysical priority in which the very condition of 
possibility for human love is first found in the fact that God’s love is made available to us, and 
that, acting in us, can bring about love within the human community.  It is through this dynamic 
of love, and the metaphysical structure of causation that explains it, that love becomes the 
fundamental basis for all truly human action, because for Aquinas the principle ends of human 
acts are: “God, self, and others, since we do whatever we do for the sake of one of these.”56 
The love that we have for God is not limited to some pious expression of adoration, or 
confined in religious acts of devotion, but the superadded grace is so powerful that it spills over 
into all of the other virtues, completing them and informing them.  In fact, it is by extension of 
the friendship between a person and God that the human person first, and most perfectly, gains 
the virtue necessary to be a social creature.  Aquinas states that it is on the basis of our friendship 
with God that we extend friendship and charity to other people.  In fact, in the same way that 
human friendship may be expanded to include the friends of a friend, the friendship that we have 
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for God spills over to all of God’s other friends, “so that, in this way, the friendship of charity 
extends even to our enemies, whom we love out of charity in relation to God, to Whom the 
friendship of charity is chiefly directed.”57  Therefore, the primary virtue through which the 
human person relates to other people, and the virtue that primarily defines how human persons 
should relate to one another, is that of charity.  Charity is the primary social virtue.   
The divine gift of charity also spills over into the other virtues and transforms them.  
Charity becomes the form of all of the virtues.  Schockenhoff states, “Just as revelation does not 
extinguish natural reason, and grace does not destroy human freedom, so charity is effective in 
justice and through justice, in courage and through courage, and in the tactful conduct of 
prudence and through the tactful conduct of prudence.58  When divine charity is animating the 
virtues they take on a sufficiently different form that some of them are transformed into the gifts 
of the Holy Spirit.  Aquinas states that these gifts, although maintaining many of the 
characteristics of the original virtue, are different species from the natural virtue that is attainable 
apart from the dynamics of grace.59  This is why the gift of wisdom, which acts upon theoretical 
reasoning, is found as a subcategory to charity.  
2.2  Theoretical reasoning by the virtue of wisdom 
 
The virtues that operate in the intellect to assist it in acquiring theoretical truth are 
wisdom, science, and understanding.60  Aquinas orders his list of virtues again in a hierarchy of 
causality, ranging from highest cause through practicality to the most fundamental principles.  
This order is also an inversion of the order of experience.  The first two virtues in the order of 
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understood in Aquinas’ theology.  Certainly any contemporary appropriation of Aquinas’ ethics must reflect 
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experience, science and understanding, are fascinating in their own right, but have little impact 
on the social sphere and are, therefore, only of peripheral interest and will receive simply a 
cursory introduction.  Understanding is the virtue by which the intellect comes to ascertain the 
truth in things that are known in themselves, and comprehended as a principle.  The virtue of 
understanding is the most basic of the virtues that assist theoretical reasoning.  It assists the 
intellect in the apprehension and application of formal knowledge, of the principles of causality, 
and the simple truths of things that are immediately graspable by the intellect and that underwrite 
more complicated interactions.61  It would belong to understanding to operate the intellectual 
functions of logic, mathematics, and to consider various states of being in the abstract, such as 
health or flourishing.  Science is the collection of virtues necessary for the intellect to know 
matter and how the objects of the physical world relate to the first principles derived through the 
application of understanding. 62  It is through science that we would explore the physical 
properties of our familiar berry, investigate the physical aspects of its life as the fruit of its plant, 
and determine how it relates nutritionally to human health; that is, should we eat it.63     
The virtue through which the natures of things are deduced and contemplated is wisdom.  
It is through the virtue of wisdom that the relationships between things are evaluated. Wisdom is 
the virtue through which the intellect comprehends things that are not known at once, but are 
known only by means of reason’s extensive inquiry.64  Through wisdom one is able to unite 
various aspects of science and understanding, one is able to incorporate the knowledge and 
understanding of other people contained within tradition, and one is able to order and prioritize 
the value of goods.  Wisdom is able to consider objects in relation to higher goods, highest 
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causes, and natural ends.  According to Aquinas, it belongs to wisdom “to consider the highest 
cause.  By means of that cause we are able to form a most certain judgment about other causes, 
and according thereto all things should be set in order.”65  Natural wisdom is sufficient for 
ordering things according to the highest relative good of the person, e.g. common good.  
Therefore it is according to wisdom that the social order is established and the relationships 
within the social structure are theoretically based.  This aspect of natural wisdom does not 
require the superaddition of grace or infusion of charity to function for human happiness and an 
effective social order.  However, when the content of divine revelation present in Scripture and 
Tradition is added to natural wisdom, along with the experience of grace that comes through a 
relationship with God in the community of the Church, a new synthesis is possible through 
which the order of things, including the social order and the articulations of the common good, is 
established according to divine intent.  Therefore the gift of wisdom, through which relative 
goods and relative causes are established, is associated to the virtue of charity, by which ultimate 
goods and ultimate causes are grasped.  Aquinas defines the relationship between charity and 
wisdom: “Consequently wisdom which is a gift, has its cause in the will, which cause is charity, 
but it has its essence in the intellect, whose act is to judge aright.”66 
It is through wisdom acting upon theoretical reasoning that natures are understood and 
related to one another.  It is, therefore, within the domain of wisdom that theoretical reason 
comes to know the principles of the natural law.  However, with reason acting under the 
influence of wisdom one can employ divine revelation, human or divine tradition, and various 
articulations of the principles of the common good to move beyond the requirements of the 
natural law.  When applying the fruits of theoretical reasoning to the domain of ethical action 
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Aquinas states, “…if we speak of virtuous acts, considered in themselves, i.e. in their proper 
species, thus not all virtuous acts are prescribed by the natural law: for many things are done 
virtuously, to which nature does not incline at first; but which through the inquiry of reason, have 
been found by men to be conducive to well-living.”67  Since wisdom is the virtue that governs 
the inquiry of reason, and that determines and judges the right relationships between things, it is 
the primary virtue responsible for forming the theoretical principles that underwrite an 
articulation of the common good and govern human interactions.  Wisdom is the primary virtue 
that governs relationships between things, goods, people, organizations, cities, states, and 
nations.  As such, wisdom is the fundamental social virtue.  Although charity guides our 
contemplation towards the highest goods, and provides the motivation for seeking the good of 
others as belonging to the good of God, Aquinas states that wisdom is necessary for charity to 
accomplish this end.  He indicates that “it belongs to charity to be at peace, but it belongs to 
wisdom to make peace by setting things in order.”68  
In summary, the virtue by which the intellect turns its attention to the highest relative 
causes and natures, the virtue through which the highest relative good is established, and the 
virtue through which the articulations of the social order and the common good is made is that of 
wisdom.  When wisdom is infused with charity it can attain to the divine intentions that inform 
these ultimate ends, and how the common good relates to the divine good.  This is the theoretical 
foundation upon which social interaction can be understood; however, it is not enough to discern 
these things in the abstract.  Theoretical reason, brought to perfection through all of its associated 
virtues, must give way to practical reasoning through which specific choices can be made, and 
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means can be selected by which one may attain the due ends previously assigned through 
theoretical reasoning.  Aquinas states that for a choice to be truly good, two things are necessary: 
First, that the intention be directed to a due end; and this is done by moral virtue, which 
inclines the appetitive faculty to the good that is in accord with reason, which is a due 
end.  Secondly, that man take rightly those things which have reference to the end: and 
this he cannot do unless his reason counsel, judge and command aright, which is the 
function of prudence and the virtues annexed to it.”69 
 
Therefore, in order to continue our investigation of the way that the social virtues operate within 
Aquinas’ system, we must turn our attention to the virtues that operate upon theoretical 
reasoning and through which one discerns the most appropriate means to achieve the ends 
articulated by theoretical reasoning and sought through a well-ordered will that is operating with 
sufficient moral virtue. 
2.3  Practical reasoning and the virtue of prudence 
 
One of the major difficulties that arises when discussing Aquinas’ system of virtues is 
that there are multiple layers of translation operating, and that each layer of language carries its 
own set of nuances and connotations.  One of the central difficulties in translating or 
understanding Aquinas’ virtue of prudence is that he translated Aristotle’s Greek word 
phronesis, which can be understood as “practical wisdom,” into the Latin prudentia which 
carries the connotation of foresight among other things.  However, Aquinas defines his use of 
prudentia as “right reason with respect to actions;” therefore, he was using the Latin word but 
maintaining more of the Greek connotation.70  To further muddy the linguistic waters, the 
English word prudence, which is used to translate Aquinas’ virtue prudentia, has many different 
definitions, each with its own set of connotations.  In its current usage, it carries some negative 
connotations, some of which can be detected in such synonymous terms and phrases as: caution, 
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70 Phronesis = φρόνησις.  Right reason with respect to actions = recta ratio agibilium. 
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discretion, regard for one’s own interest, wise management, or frugality.71  For Aquinas, the 
word we translate into English as “prudence” does not contain the negative tenor that 
contemporary English has gained; therefore, understanding how Aquinas uses the term requires 
that we set aside the contemporary usage and strive to understand the word as he defines it.   
As stated previously, it is important to keep in mind that for Aquinas the distinctions and 
definitions, faculties and habits, and the various aspects of the human person are never absolutely 
distinct but always acting in concert in the unified human person.  Therefore, although we are 
going to focus our attention on how it is that the virtue of prudence acts upon and perfects 
practical reasoning, and how it is a virtue that bears much responsibility in the social sphere, it is 
not to be thought of as exercising its habit apart from the rest of the virtues and faculties.  While 
discussing the cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, temperance and fortitude he says:  
It may also be said that these four virtues qualify one another by a kind of overflow.  For 
the qualities of prudence overflow on to the other virtues in so far as they are directed by 
prudence.  And each of the others overflows on to the rest, for the reason that whoever 
can do what is harder, can do what is less difficult.72  
 
All of the virtues impact one another and work in concert with the faculties of the soul in the 
process of human flourishing; nevertheless, prudence has primacy of place among them.  The 
interpenetration of the virtues is manifested in the fact that Aquinas follows Aristotle in saying 
that prudence is the means by which one arrives at the intended good, as determined through 
wisdom; therefore prudence can be called a type of “wisdom about human affairs.”73   Since it is 
through prudence that one is able to attain the relative goods of human flourishing, such as basic 
physical needs, good governance, and peaceful relations, Aquinas says that prudence is “wisdom 
                                                
71 Westberg, 3. 
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73 ST, II-II, Q47, Art. 2.   
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for man, but not wisdom absolutely.”74  In some ways, the greater convergence of prudence and 
natural wisdom in Aquinas’ system, when compared to Aristotle, is a result of the fact that for 
Aquinas the highest good for the human person is union with the loving and eternal God, and 
dependent upon the gift of wisdom empowered through grace and the virtue of charity.  
Relativized by this lofty goal, the ends associated with the natural happiness fall short, and have 
more of the quality of practical reason than that of true contemplation through wisdom.  
Nevertheless, this association of prudence with wisdom is only accidental since prudence, when 
considered on its own, functions only in the practical reason and even the relative goods of 
natural happiness are assigned by wisdom functioning within the theoretical reasoning.  
Although prudence and natural wisdom operate very closely together in Aquinas’ system, and 
both are changed and united through infused grace, he reiterates the distinction between them: “It 
does not belong to prudence to appoint the end, but only to regulate the means.”75   
Aquinas provides the most complete definition of prudence in his treatment of the 
intellectual virtues in the Ia IIae when he is addressing the virtues somewhat removed from the 
context of the theological project of the ethics of the IIa IIae: 
Prudence is a virtue most necessary for human life.  For a good life consists in good 
deeds.  Now in order to do good deeds, it matters not only what a man does, but also how 
he does it; to wit, that he do it from right choice and not merely from impulse or passion.  
And, since choice is about things in reference to the end, rectitude of choice requires two 
things: namely, the due end, and something suitably ordained to that due end.  Now man 
is suitably directed to his due end by a virtue which perfects the soul in the appetitive 
part, the object of which is the good and the end.  And to that which is suitably ordained 
to the due end man needs to be rightly disposed by a habit in his reason, because counsel 
and choice, which are about things ordained to the end, are acts of the reason.  
Consequently an intellectual virtue is needed in the reason, to perfect the reason, and 
make it suitably affected towards things ordained to the end; and this virtue is prudence.76  
                                                
74 ST, II-II, Q47, Art. 2.  “prudentia est sapientia viro, non autem sapientia simpliciter.”  See also: Aristotle, NE, 
Book VI, Chapter 5. In which Aristotle does say that prudence has this function but does not explicitly call it 
wisdom. 
75 ST, II-II, Q47, Art. 6. 
76 ST, I-II, Q57, A5. 
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While theoretical reasoning produces a description of what human flourishing and happiness 
look like, the means for moving towards the goal of happiness within the context of the common 
good are developed and presented through the exercise of practical reasoning assisted by 
prudence.  Therefore, the specific ways in which the common good can be expressed in laws and 
social structures, that is, how the universal principles contained in the theoretical presentation of 
human flourishing and the common good can be applied within a specific set of circumstances, is 
the domain of practical reasoning assisted by prudence.   
 In his discussion of the relationship between the intellect and will, especially within the 
context of the priority of the virtue of prudence, Fr. Daniel Westberg warns: 
If one agrees with the common view that the will is the pivot in human action, then one 
will have a distorted impression of Thomas’s view of the interaction of reason and the 
will in the process of deliberation and choice and in the possibilities for error and sin.  If 
the will is seen as the primary factor in the process of deciding, then it follows that if a 
wrong decision is made, the will is the responsible factor.”77 
 
Westberg posits that if one assumes that the will is the primary source of error and sin, then it 
would only make sense that one must attend most closely to the virtues of the will that act to 
perfect it and habituate it.  Although this is a legitimate theory, with its own merits, Westberg 
thinks it can lead to a misappropriation of Aquinas, because Aquinas does not structure his 
virtues in this way, or give priority to the virtues of the will.  A contemporary appropriation of 
Aquinas must accept that for him the intellect, operating through prudence, enjoys priority of 
place.  To shift this priority to the will is to misunderstand Aquinas and contort his system to 
accommodate theological presuppositions that Aquinas does not share.  Westberg goes so far as 
to say that the proper relationship between intellect and will has “thus become the crux of the 
problem in understanding the nature of prudentia in St Thomas…”78 
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Aquinas’ inversion of Aristotle’s architecture of the virtues is not simply a rhetorical 
device, or an arbitrary architectural decision.  It extends from a profound commitment to the 
order of causation.  God is the ultimate source of all things and provides the meaning and 
rationality of the universe.  Since this God is love, and in God the intellect and will are perfectly 
united, these facts determine the nature of created reality and provide the foundational dynamics 
of our own experience.  The order of causation grounds our experience in the character of God 
and, since we are created in the image of God and share in his character, we have confidence that 
our intellect is able to penetrate into the deep realities of the world and provide access to the true 
causes at play.  Even though the individual person is inducted into this order in a manner that 
follows Aristotle’s didactic scheme, the order itself, and the context in which the individual is 
inducted, are governed according to the hierarchy of causes.  Therefore, primacy is given to the 
fundamental principles that form the structure of reality, and the virtues that help us grasp them.  
Translating this from the theoretical into the practical reasoning, Aquinas states, “Consequently 
just as right reason in speculative matters, in so far as it proceeds from naturally known 
principles, presupposes the understanding of those principles, so also does prudence, which is 
right reason about things to be done.”79   And, indeed, the principles that govern human ethical 
behavior, and that govern the moral virtues that perfect the will, are principles of reason that are 
applied through prudence.  Aquinas states that the “ends of moral virtue must of necessity pre-
exist in the reason.”80  And this pre-existence of the principles of moral virtue is brought about, 
as we have seen, through the exercise of synderesis.  Therefore, there is within Aquinas’ moral 
scheme an implicit hierarchy—synderesis, wisdom, prudence, and then the moral virtues.81  
Through the virtue of synderesis the agent is able to grasp the fundamental moral principles, the 
                                                
79 ST, II-II, Q58, Art. 4, c. 
80 ST, II-II, Q47, Art. 6. 
81 ST, II-II, Q47, Art. 6, ad 3.  For more on this see:  Keenan, 260.  He enumerates the same list without wisdom. 
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goals of human action are defined by theoretical reasoning operating with wisdom, the specific 
means of arriving at these theoretical goals are chosen by practical reasoning guided by 
prudence, and then guided by the moral virtues the will acts in choosing what the intellect 
presents to it as good.  Aquinas concludes, “Accordingly, when he [Augustine] says that virtue is 
the art of right conduct, this applies to prudence essentially; but to other virtues, by participation, 
for as much as they are directed by prudence.”82 
Prudence is one of the most crucial virtues for human flourishing and the pursuit of 
happiness because it has an effect in both the intellectual and moral domains.  It is a bridge 
virtue, and not only does it have the ability to impact both practical and moral reasoning but it 
serves to unite many aspects of human action.  Aquinas demonstrates the simultaneous 
interconnectedness and primacy of prudence over the other virtues: 
The end concerns the moral virtues, not as though they appointed the end, but because 
they tend to the end which is appointed by natural reason.  On this they are helped by 
prudence, which prepares the way for them, by disposing the means.  Hence it follows 
that prudence is more excellent than the moral virtues, and moves them.83  
 
Daniel Mark Nelson, in his thesis, Priority of Prudence, states that Aquinas’ ethical theory is not 
primarily a theory of the natural law, but of virtue in which the organizing dynamic is that of 
practical reason acting with prudence.  Although Nelson elevates prudence to a degree that 
relativizes and marginalizes other virtues and the need for grace, he correctly identifies the 
central place of prudence in Aquinas’ conceptualization of the human act.  Nelson points out that 
the two aspects of Aquinas’ thought that are often used to guide ethical discourse and that 
dominate the contemporary appropriations of his ethical system.  These aspects are the principles 
of natural law and the subsequent “socialization” of these principles through the virtue of justice, 
by which the human person becomes connected to other people.  The emphasis on these two 
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features, Nelson argues, fails to properly appreciate the role of prudence in Aquinas’ system.  It 
is clear that, for Aquinas, the virtue of prudence and its context of practical reasoning presume 
the social context of the human agent and include the relationships therein.  One does not have to 
invoke justice to connect the virtuous person to other people.  As we have seen, both wisdom and 
charity are social virtues.  Both govern how people relate to one another through the relative 
highest goal of the common good and through the ultimate goal of union with God.  In addition, 
Aquinas states clearly that prudence governs the human person in all of his or her relationships: 
Wherefore there must needs be different species of prudence corresponding to these 
different ends, so that one is "prudence" simply so called, which is directed to one's own 
good; another, "domestic prudence" which is directed to the common good of the home; 
and a third, "political prudence," which is directed to the common good of the state or 
kingdom.84  
 
Practical reason is guided by prudence to the correct and appropriate means by which the 
common good can be achieved.  Therefore, the particular characteristics of social institutions, 
laws, social structures, and the like are the practical applications and manifestations of the ideas 
and principles of the common good as presented and expressed through theoretical reasoning.  
Aquinas postulates that there are different species of prudence according to the end: prudence, 
domestic prudence, political prudence.85  Because the relative and absolute goods of human 
flourishing are intrinsically social, there must be a type of prudence that governs all aspects of 
practical reasoning such that the agent can attain happiness.  Accordingly, since it belongs to 
prudence rightly to “counsel, judge, and command” concerning the means of obtaining a due 
end, it is “evident that prudence regards not only the private good of the individual, but also the 
common good of the multitude.”86  Therefore, prudence, like wisdom and charity, is an 
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essentially social virtue and governs our interactions with other people according to a specific 
concept of the common good articulated through wisdom.   
For Aquinas, as for Aristotle, the relationship of the individual to the society is one of 
part to whole, and imperfect to perfect.  Therefore, the flourishing and happiness of the 
individual person is inextricably bound up with the common good and universal happiness 
presented in the well-ordered society: 
Moreover, since every part is ordained to the whole, as imperfect to perfect; and since 
one man is a part of the perfect community, the law must needs regard properly the 
relationship to universal happiness.  Wherefore the Philosopher, in the above definition of 
legal matters mentions both happiness and the body politic: for he says that we call those 
legal matters "just, which are adapted to produce and preserve happiness and its parts for 
the body politic": since the state is a perfect community.87  
 
It is according to the conclusions of practical reasoning guided by prudence, which are 
themselves circumstantial manifestations of the universal principles defined by theoretical 
reasoning, that society is governed and that the relationships between individuals are defined and 
oriented towards the common good.  The more hierarchical the society the more distance there is 
for the average citizen between the functions of wisdom and prudence, since the structure and 
positive law of the society are received more passively and obeyed more directly through an act 
of the will.  The more democratic and egalitarian a society is, the more that the virtues of 
prudence and wisdom are united in their functioning with respect to the articulation of the 
common good. And the more that, with regard to social interactions, the intellect functioning 
under the guidance of prudence dominates the will functioning under the guidance of justice. 
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2.4   THE WILL AND THE INFLUENCE OF THE VIRTUE OF IUSTITIA (JUSTICE) 
 
It is immediately after the discussion of the virtue of prudence that Aquinas turns his 
attention to the virtue of iustitia.88  He has already discussed how it is that theoretical reasoning, 
assisted by wisdom, comprehends human nature and articulates principles of flourishing that 
include the relationship of individuals to society.  In his discussion of prudence it seems that the 
virtue guides and perfects practical reasoning such that the common good and human flourishing 
described by theoretical reasoning, according to human nature, can find expression in the real 
world and become manifest through social structures, laws, and practical application.  It is then 
the duty of the virtue of iustitia to move the will of the person to choose to give each person his 
or her due according to the common good as articulated by theoretical reasoning.  Therefore, 
iustitia effects the good that is prescribed by prudence.89 
In agreement with ancient tradition, Aquinas offers the basic definition of iustitia as the 
disposition of the will “to render to each one his due.”90  What each person is due is defined by 
reason—theoretical reason defining the principles of what is due, and practical reason defining 
the particulars.  Aquinas makes it clear that iustitia does not aim at directing an act of the 
intellect, but of the will:   
Now iustitia does not aim at directing an act of the cognitive power, for we are not said to 
be just through knowing something aright.  Hence the subject of iustitia is not the 
intellect or reason which is a cognitive power.  But since we are said to be just through 
doing something aright, and because the proximate principle of action is the appetitive 
power, iustitia must needs be in some appetitive power as its subject.  Now the appetite is 
twofold; namely, the will which is in the reason and the sensitive appetite which follows 
on sensitive apprehension, and is divided into the irascible and the concupiscible…Again 
                                                
88 In order to facilitate the disambiguation I will use the Latin “iustitia” when discussing Aquinas’ virtue.  I will not 
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89 ST, II-II, Q123, Art. 12.  “Prudence, since it is a perfection of reason, has the good essentially: while iustitia 
effects this good.”  “Hoc autem bonum essentialiter quidem habet prudentia, quae est perfectio rationis. Iustitia 
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90 ST, II-II, Q58, Art. 11.  “Et ideo proprius actus iustitiae nihil est aliud quam reddere unicuique quod suum est.” 
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the act of rendering his due to each man cannot proceed from the sensitive appetite, 
because sensitive apprehension does not go so far as to be able to consider the relation of 
one thing to another; but this is proper to the reason.  Therefore iustitia cannot be in the 
irascible or concupiscible as its subject, but only in the will.91  
 
This is one of Aquinas’ most brilliant contributions to the theory of iustitia.  Aquinas seizes on a 
phrase in the Nicomachean Ethics in which Aristotle is summarizing a typical commonsense 
understanding of iustitia: “Apparently everyone wants to call justice that habit by which men are 
disposed to just works, and by which they actually perform and will just deeds.”92  Launching 
from this phrase, and others like it in Aristotle’s ethics, Aquinas makes a profound adjustment to 
the nature of the virtue by securing iustitia within the domain of the will.  Aquinas then declares 
that the primary function of the virtue of iustitia is to turn the attention of the will towards the 
common good expressed within the social order.93  Aquinas points out the deficiency in 
Aristotle’s concept of iustitia.  He says that Aristotle directs “our principal attention to what a 
man does externally; how he is influenced internally we consider only as a by-product.”94  To 
correct this deficiency Aquinas locates the virtue of iustitia squarely within his psychological 
structure by attaching it to the power of the will.  By doing so he allows for an exploration of 
how the agent’s interior dispositions connect to the external realities of social interaction.  In her 
book that compares and contrasts the concepts of the common good found in Aristotle and 
Aquinas, Mary Keys states: 
By incorporating natural law, its broader common good, and the will explicitly into his 
dialectic, indeed into the very definition of justice, Aquinas is able simultaneously to 
situate justice more deeply in the interiority of the person and to extend its scope more 
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92 Aristotle, NE Book V, Chapter 1, (1129a6)  “ὁρῶµεν δὴ πάντας τὴν τοιαύτην ἕξιν βουλοµένους λέγειν 
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τρόπον καὶ περὶ ἀδικίας, ἀφ᾽ ἧς ἀδικοῦσι καὶ βούλονται τὰ ἄδικα.”  See also: Keys, 181. 
93 ST, II-II, Q58, Art. 6. 
94 Aquinas, Commentary on the NE, Book V, Chapter 1, Lecture I, 281. 
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broadly toward a universal good.  Aquinas can thus defend more boldly than did Aristotle 
the perfective, nonalienating status of care for the common good.95  
 
Locating the virtue of iustitia specifically within the will allows the virtue to function as a part of 
his overall psychological theory.  In addition, Aquinas provides yet another external point of 
reference for the individual agent.  The proper object of the will’s intention, when operating 
through iustitia, is the existent social order of which the individual is a part.  Since Aquinas has a 
developed concept of the will, it is able to mediate the connection between iustitia and the 
common good in a manner that strengthens and defines both the internal disposition and its 
connection to the external reality of the social order.  For Aquinas the goal of iustitia is to hold 
people “together in society and mutual intercourse…Therefore iustitia is concerned only about 
our dealings with others.”96  It is not the only virtue that is concerned about our dealings with 
others, but it is the virtue that is only concerned with those dealings.  Aquinas admits that there is 
a metaphorical application of the term iustitia.  Under the metaphorical use of iustitia the term is 
applied to the whole process by which an agent acts with proper regard for others.  This 
metaphorical extension of the virtue, Aquinas claims, is due to the unity of the agent; however, 
this use lacks the precision of the term as he is defining it: as a virtue that acts upon the will 
alone.97 
Iustitia influences the actions of a person by directing his or her actions towards the 
common good just as charity directs the actions towards the divine good, but the characteristics 
of both the common good and the divine good, as has been demonstrated, are the proper domain 
                                                
95 Keys, 198.  Mary M. Keys, is a graduate from Boston College who serves as a professor of political theory at 
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of reason.98  Since iustitia is a disposition of the will, it does not exercise direct influence on the 
rational articulations of what exactly each person is due; it simply assists the person to act in 
accordance with whatever the intellect has decided is due to each according to the right social 
order.  Aquinas does allow that iustitia is related to reason through a kind of nearness: “Since the 
will is the rational appetite, when the rectitude of the reason which is called truth is imprinted on 
the will on account of its nighness to the reason, this imprint retains the name of truth; and hence 
it is that iustitia sometimes goes by the name of truth.”99  However, the will has a two-fold 
receptivity with respect to the truth of the social order.  First, the will is receptive with respect to 
the action of the intellect.  The conclusions of reason are transferred to the will through the 
exercise of the intellect because of the will’s proximity to the functions of reason.  Although the 
will, as the intellectual appetite, would impact the process by initially turning the intellect 
towards the social structure, and maintaining its interest in the social structure, it would not 
participate in the process of reasoning itself, be able to register critique of reasoning, or arrive at 
any conclusions.  
The will also shares with the intellect a kind of receptivity with respect to the object of 
the social order.  Since the intellect engages the social order within the context of reasoning, it 
does so in a more active fashion, and equipped with various critical and analytical tools.  
However, since the social order predates the agent, and is not a result of the individual exercise 
of reason, the social order is an actively received reality.  One of the great benefits of the active 
receptivity is that it grounds the experience of the individual person, connects her or him to the 
order of social interaction, and affords a theoretical framework through which the process of 
socialization can be understood.  For Aquinas, the fact that the social order is actively received 
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reflects both the dependence of the individual upon the community, and the dependence of the 
community on the providence of God, who is involved in the multifarious historical process 
through which social forms arise.   
The drawback of the receptivity of the will and intellect with respect to the social order is 
that it places some theoretical constraints on the ability of individual agents to act autonomously 
or to critique the social order.  “In those matters that relate to himself,” Aquinas says, “man is 
master of himself, and that he may do as he likes; whereas in matters that refer to another it 
appears manifestly that a man is under obligation to render to another that which is his due.”100  
Therefore the manner in which “that which is due” is defined partially determines the freedom of 
the individual with respect to the society and the obligations due to the society.  This is 
especially pronounced, as mentioned previously, in social forms in which political power resides 
in fewer agents.  The receptivity of the will and intellect with respect to the social order produces 
a relationship of the individual to the community that is uncomfortably constrained by 
contemporary standards, but an articulation that is consistent with most pre-modern political 
theories and one that can be useful today as society becomes increasingly aware of social sin, 
structures of sin, unfair economic systems, and the force of political ideology.  If one considers 
the will and the intellect receptive, it becomes clear how a person can act “justly” within a social 
structure that, when critiqued by another articulation of social order or human flourishing, might 
be condemned as intrinsically unjust.   
For instance, many of the social structures that Aquinas engages in the section on iustitia 
are now viewed with suspicion or even outright rejection.  When discussing whether or not “right 
is the object of iustitia,” Aquinas presents a theory by which iustitia functions as a protector of 
the values ensconced in the social order—a social order that contains elements that contemporary 
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Western culture rejects on the basis of a presumption of radical equality.  To relieve the 
uncomfortable tension that arises in Aquinas’ discussion of iustitia, some authors will attempt to 
interject radical equality into Aquinas’ theory through the selective quoting of the following 
passage: 
It is proper to iustitia, as compared with the other virtues, to direct man in his relations 
with others: because it denotes a kind of equality, as its very name implies; indeed we are 
wont to say that things are adjusted when they are made equal, for equality is in reference 
of one thing to some other.101  
 
This passage is used to suggest that the idea of absolute and universal equality between human 
persons exists in Aquinas’ ethical theory.  Taken out of context, it does seem to support such an 
idea, but one does not have to look far to see that Aquinas is simply not proposing the kind of 
absolute and universal human equality that is valued highly in much of Western society today.   
Aquinas qualifies the equality he is referring to by saying: “For the equality of 
distributive iustitia consists in allotting various things to various persons in proportion to their 
personal dignity.”102  Using the political theory present in Aristotle’s Politics and the 
Nicomachean Ethics, Aquinas mentions some of the inequalities present in the social 
organization.  The first category of inequalities is found in domestic relationships.  Aquinas 
speaks of children, slaves, and wives as “belonging to” the father.103  There is not iustitia 
between father and son, nor master and slave, because their relations stand in the context of the 
sharply distinct domestic roles presumed in a profoundly patriarchal structure.  Aquinas 
uncritically employs Aristotle’s statements that wives, children, and slaves “belong to the father” 
                                                
101 ST, II-II, Q57, Art. 1. 
102 ST, II-II, Q63, Art. 1. 
103 When Aquinas speaks of slaves he is not speaking of the type of race-based chattel slavery practiced in the 
United States.  Stephen Brett, in his book Slavery and the Catholic Tradition: Rights in the Balance, states: “Since 
St. Thomas deemed the kind of slavery know to him (medieval serfdom) to be repugnant to naturalis ratio, he could 
not have failed to categorize the far more pernicious species of slavery based on race in the New World as a fortiori 
repugnant to naturalis ratio and therefore by definition to his understanding of the jus gentium.”  Brett, 78.   
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and that “it is impossible to treat oneself unjustly.”104  Aquinas’ use of Aristotle’s domestic 
scheme flatly contradicts the idea that he is dedicated to a concept of absolute equality in his 
theory of iustitia.  Aquinas also follows Aristotle’s lead in moderating the potential abuse in 
domestic relationships by offering that iustitia does exist in domestic relationships “in a way,” 
but in the domestic structure there is not the kind of unqualified iustitia that exists between true 
equals.   
It belongs to iustitia to render to each one his right, the distinction between individuals 
being presupposed: for if a man gives himself his due, this is not strictly called "just." 
And since what belongs to the son is his father's, and what belongs to the slave is his 
master's, it follows that properly speaking there is not iustitia of father to son, or of 
master to slave. A son, as such, belongs to his father, and a slave, as such, belongs to his 
master; yet each, considered as a man, is something having separate existence and 
distinct from others. Hence in so far as each of them is a man, there is iustitia towards 
them in a way: and for this reason too there are certain laws regulating the relations of 
father to his son, and of a master to his slave; but in so far as each is something belonging 
to another, the perfect idea of "right" or "just" is wanting to them.105 
 
If the son or the slave was considered as an individual, and not within the context of the 
relationships of the house, then iustitia does exist between them.  Since the domestic 
relationships are not formally part of the external social order, but are instead part of the internal 
order of the patriarchal self-rule, they are not properly governed by iustitia, but must be 
governed by another virtue.  It is counterintuitive that a son or slave would be given greater 
protection from abuse when considered apart from their relationship with the father; however, 
the reason for this is that the domestic relationships are not governed by the virtue of iustitia, as 
defined and codified in the legal structure of the social order, but by the virtue of charity.  The 
standard of charity is significantly higher than the standard of mere iustitia; therefore, the son 
                                                
104 Aristotle, NE, Book V, Chapter 11, (1138a14). 
105 ST, II-II, Q57, Art. 4.  This follows Aristotle in Book V, Chapter 11: “In a metaphorical and analogical sense 
however there is such a thing as justice, not towards oneself but between different parts of one’s nature; not, it is 
true, justice in the full sense of the term, but such justice as subsists between master and slave, or between the head 
of the household and his wife and children.”  “κατὰ µεταφορὰν δὲ καὶ ὁµοιότητα ἔστιν οὐκ αὐτῷ πρὸς αὑτὸν 
δίκαιον ἀλλὰ τῶν αὐτοῦ τισίν, οὐ πᾶν δὲ δίκαιον ἀλλὰ τὸ δεσποτικὸν ἢ τὸ οἰκονοµικόν” 
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and slave are afforded even greater protection and importance than that which would be made 
available through iustitia.  Indeed they should be loved as much as the father loves himself.106 
As Aquinas continues his discussion of how iustitia operates it becomes clear that the 
relationship between husband and wife was also determined through the virtue of charity and not 
iustitia.  However, this relationship simultaneously enjoys greater access to iustitia through the 
woman’s engagement with the social order, and attenuated independence due to Aquinas’ 
perspective that women are intellectually inferior to men.   In this section of his treatment of 
iustitia, Aquinas is not interested in discussing the relationships between men and women 
extensively; however, Aquinas accepts that women are fundamentally inferior to men and should 
be governed by them.  He formed this opinion using a combination of the Politics of Aristotle 
and the testimony of Scripture.107  In his letter to the Ephesians St. Paul says that “a husband is 
the head of his wife” and to the Corinthians he states that “man is the head of woman.”108 
Aquinas concludes from this Scriptural reference that men are intellectually superior to women.  
The combination of this conclusion with Aristotle’s justification of social order through the 
principles of form and matter in his metaphysical biology formed the foundation of philosophical 
justification of male superiority for centuries.  Clearly, any contemporary appropriation of 
Aquinas’ ethics would require that the mistakes of Aristotle’s metaphysical biology be corrected, 
and that contemporary interpretations of Scripture be employed, such that women are understood 
as possessing the same dignity and viewed as having the same intellectual capacity as men.  
                                                
106 For Aristotle the father and child are related through natural affection and obedience “στέργοντες καὶ εὐπειθεῖς” 
Book X, Chapter 9 (1180b); whereas for Aquinas the father and child are related through charity.  In his 
Commentary on the NE Aquinas notes that charity is the more efficacious in guiding towards the good.  Book X, 
Chapter 9, Lecture XV, (§2159), pg. 644. 
107 Aquinas wrote a commentary on the Politics of Aristotle in which he makes very little criticism of the social 
theory contained therein.  See: Richard J. Regan, trans. Commentary on the Politics, (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2007).  
108 Ephesians 5:23, 1 Corinthians 11:3. (RSV) 
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However, in a contemporary appropriation it would be desirable that the domestic relationships 
are held to the higher standard of the virtue of charity, as opposed to mere iustitia.109   
At the end of his treatment of the domestic relationships between husband and wife, 
Aquinas shifts to the other category of social inequality: 
…For the good order would have been wanting in the human family if some were not 
governed by others wiser than themselves. So by such a kind of subjection woman is 
naturally subject to man, because in man the discretion of reason predominates.  Nor is 
inequality among men excluded by the state of innocence, as we shall prove.110 
 
The end of the quote indicates that, in addition to the presumed inequalities of the domestic 
relationships, Aquinas accepts that there are inequalities based on social status or function.  
There exists a proportionality of what is due to each person according to how they relate to the 
common good as expressed in the structure of the functioning society: 
… the matter of iustitia is an external operation in so far as either it or the thing we use 
by it is made proportionate to some other person to whom we are related by iustitia.  Now 
each man's own is that which is due to him according to equality of proportion.  
Therefore the proper act of iustitia is nothing else than to render to each one his own.111  
 
For Aquinas there is a kind of equality that exists between all people, but this equality is 
modified and qualified according to each person’s relationship to the social structures that are 
defined and expressed through reason’s attempt to comprehend human nature.  In Aquinas’ view 
there is nothing unnatural about human governance; in fact, governance would have existed in 
the prelapsarian world.112   Aquinas agreed with Aristotle that various individuals were endowed 
with differing natural qualities such that a natural order of governance would arise among them.  
However, Aquinas did use Scripture and tradition to temper Aristotle’s belief that men were of 
such radically varied natural endowments that true ownership or natural slavery could exist 
                                                
109 And it would emphasize the verses following those used by Aquinas in which husbands are commanded to love 
their wives.  Ephesians 5:25.  Expanding this command to include the full set of domestic relationships. 
110 ST, I, Q92, Art. 1. 
111 ST, II-II, Q58, Art. 11. 
112 ST, I, Q96, Art. 4. 
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among people.  Aquinas unequivocally states that in a world unmarked by sin slavery and 
“dominion through which one person’s actions are not directed to his or her own end” would not 
exist.113  And that an unhealthy dominion of man over woman, or master over slave, is due to sin 
and not according to the natural order created by God. 
 The simple fact of the matter is that Aquinas is not particularly interested in expressing 
one social structure over another.  Both the inequalities of domestic life and the inequalities 
found in the social structure are simply presented as examples of how iustitia functions within 
such a system.  Aquinas simply follows Aristotle’s presentation of domestic life and the various 
structures of governance, making a very few changes along the way when Scripture or tradition 
seemed to warrant further comment.  He reconciles Aristotle’s account of the social order to his 
own theory at times.  He includes his virtue of charity, and he argues for a greater equality of 
men through their sharing the imago Dei, but he leaves the basic structure the same.  As has been 
previously stated, Aquinas is not interested in forming an explicit theory of government or law.  
He is not interested in exploring the intricacies of political theory, nor is he endorsing a specific 
set of domestic or social structures.  Indeed, the kind of slavery being discussed in the 
Nicomachean Ethics did not exist in Aquinas’ experience and was expressly forbidden by 
ecclesial law.  Aquinas is not endorsing a social theory; he is developing a virtue theory.  And in 
the section on iustitia he is simply using Aristotle’s political theory to provide examples of how 
iustitia looks when it operates within a given set of social situations.  This is never clearer than 
when he is talking about how distributive iustitia functions within various forms of government: 
Consequently in distributive justice a person receives all the more of the common goods, 
according as he holds a more prominent position in the community.  This prominence in 
an aristocratic community is gauged according to virtue, in an oligarchy according to 
                                                
113 ST, I, Q96, Art. 4.  For an excellent discussion of this topic see: Capizzi, 31-51.   
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wealth, in a democracy according to liberty, and in various ways according to various 
forms of community.114 
 
Aquinas simply lists the same governmental forms catalogued by Aristotle.  In his discussion of 
iustitia, Aquinas does not put forth one form of government as being superior to another, or one 
set of domestic relationships as being ideal, he simply explores what the virtue would 
accomplish within whatever social structure it was located.  The virtue inclines the will to give to 
another what they are due—however that is determined.  The common good, as expressed in the 
extant social order is the object of the will acting under the influence of iustitia.  With this object 
in mind, the human agents organize their behavior in a fashion that protects the social order, 
respects the differentials contained therein, and renders unto others what they are due.  Iustitia is 
a fundamentally conservative virtue.  It serves to protect the common good by bringing 
individual actions in line with the social order, however it is expressed.  And true iustitia only 
governs relationships that are formally defined within the social structure, especially as found it 
its legal apparatus. 
It is correct to say that Aquinas was simply expressing iustitia by drawing somewhat 
uncritically from the political theory of Aristotle, and making minor adjustments according to his 
contemporary culture.  However, there is no reason to grow embarrassed of his failure to apply 
the principles of iustitia to critique the inequalities presumed in his examples of how iustitia 
operates.  For Aquinas, iustitia simply does not possess this capability.  The reason iustitia is 
applied in a differential manner and according to basic inequalities of individuals is that the 
differentials and inequalities are manifestations of the common good that are the result of 
practical reasoning making manifest the principles of theoretical reasoning applicable to the 
circumstances of his time.   
                                                
114 ST, II-II, Q61, Art. 2. 
Page 53 
In order to understand Aquinas, one must understand that social change is not brought 
about by critiquing social structures, laws, and presumptions according to the virtue of iustitia.  
Social change, rather, is accomplished through a critique of social structures, laws, and 
presumptions according to reason.  If one wants to challenge the domestic and public 
presumptions of inequality, and challenge Aquinas’ conceptualization of how individuals relate 
to the common good, one does not do so on the basis of iustitia, but on the basis of right-reason 
giving rise to a new articulation of the common good and human flourishing.  Although this 
process would require the virtue of iustitia to be present, so that one would remain dedicated to 
choosing that which gives each their due, the virtues responsible for determining what each 
person is due are wisdom and prudence acting on the intellect.  Iustitia, by contrast, acts upon the 
will.  As stated earlier, the will should not contradict what reason dictates, even if the reasoning 
is in error. 
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CHAPTER 3  CONTEMPORARY CONCEPTS OF JUSTICE 
 
3.1  The formation of a hybrid virtue 
 
One of the difficulties in understanding and appropriating Aquinas’ ethical theory is the 
way that the fundamental terminology of philosophy and political theory shifts and evolves 
through time.  Linguistic evolution is present, of course, in almost every domain of human 
communication, and poses its own set of difficulties in translating and understanding documents 
across the centuries.  Sometimes, within the natural process of evolution, a term develops stable 
and powerful connotations that entirely displace previous connotations or collapse ancient 
ambiguities into a more univocal usage.  Through the rise of utilitarianism and deontological 
methods, the contemporary American concept of justice has acquired such strong connotations 
and been employed with such broad application that it can obscure the specific and limited 
manner in which the virtue of iustitia operates in Aquinas’ system.  Our concept of justice has 
been informed by the philosophical systems of the influential political and philosophical minds 
of the seventeenth through twentieth centuries.  During these centuries various philosophers and 
political theorists developed a new lexicon of terms according to the needs of their time.  In 
response to a high degree of dissatisfaction with current political realities, many theorists 
attempted to develop a theoretical framework through which governmental systems could be 
evaluated and critiqued based on the perceived needs of the citizens.  In order to provide a basis 
for a critique of government systems, political theorists developed principles that addressed the 
manner in which individual citizens relate to one another and to the society in general.  During 
these centuries the principle of absolute equality arose and joined forces with a tendency to 
ascribe specific rights to individuals.  This combination has served as the basis for the 
reevaluation of many social presuppositions, structures, and strictures.  One of the most 
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fundamental political principles called into question was the natural, or divine, right of rulers 
based on natural differentiation of human qualities. 
 In the Aristotelian theory, governmental forms grew naturally out of the soil of 
communal living.  Aristotle viewed the human person as an intrinsically social animal and 
thought that human societies developed through historical processes according to natural 
differences within the population.  For Aristotle, within a group of people defined by a cultural 
commonality or a geographic boundary there were differential abilities and concomitant 
responsibilities.  The differential character of various persons was naturally derived and easily 
recognized within the functioning of the community.  In his view, various persons were not equal 
in function or dignity; therefore, he argued that governmental forms developed in response to 
these natural distinctions.   Some citizens were endowed with the skills necessary to govern and 
others were naturally inclined towards being governed.  The relative status in society, and the 
structures that develop to sustain and protect the right order, develop naturally, in accordance 
with reason, and through a historical process.  Although historical contingencies could produce a 
variety of different modes in which government took place, and duties and dignities were 
distributed, each of these had a natural basis and reflected true differences within the population.  
This differentiation has a profound impact upon the notion of distributive justice, since each 
person is given what they are due according to their relative dignity as defined within the social 
order.  For Aristotle, the degree of differentiation within the human population was so great as to 
underwrite natural slavery in which one person was competent, because of his or her advanced 
rational capability, to not only govern another person, but to determine and expropriate the ends 
of that person’s labor and efforts. 
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Aquinas accepted the fundamental principles of natural differentiation and government 
that Aristotle espoused.  However, Aquinas used Christian revelation and tradition to make 
profound adjustments in Aristotle’s theory.  First of all, Aquinas used Scripture and tradition to 
argue that all people share in the image and likeness of God; therefore there is a kind of 
fundamental dignity that is shared by all people, although they do possess different capabilities 
and have differential functions within society.  Aquinas founded human dignity and worth not 
upon a specific set of capabilities present in the person, but upon the relationship of the person to 
God in love.  Since the love of God is the basis of the order of causation, the fact that God is the 
beginning and end of the human person bestows on each person the dignity of God’s love.  
Aquinas argues that the image of God is in all people but the quality of the image varies 
according to how the person participates in God’s intended ends for humanity.115  Accordingly, 
he suggests three fundamental categories into which the spectrum of imaging God falls.  All 
people share in the image of God according to being created, rational beings.  The just, i.e. those 
who are conformed to the image of Christ by grace, share in the image of God through re-
creation and habituation.  And those who attain heaven share in the full likeness of God in 
blessedness.116  Because of this fundamental equality of worth, as expressed in the universal 
image of God present in all people, Aquinas argued against the notion of natural slavery.    
The second major adaptation Aquinas introduced into Aristotle’s theory of natural 
governance is that of a specifically Christian sense of divine providence.  God governs all of 
creation and this includes the governance of human society.117  God governs all things by 
bringing them into existence and leading them to their proper end, he does this in a mediated 
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fashion.118  The natural differentiation that exists within a given society extends from the wisdom 
of God through which all things are ordered towards their end.  Since the human family is 
intrinsically social and hierarchical, Aquinas believes that the differentiation of status, 
responsibility, and dignity within a society reflects the ordering of the providential God.  All 
human actions of governance are a participation in the divine ordering of creation.  Aquinas 
admits that governmental forms arise in a manner that is historically contingent; therefore, there 
arise various forms of government according to time and place.  Nevertheless, each of these 
various forms represent the divine ordering of society towards the common good through which 
the human family can grow in virtue and happiness.  When the human person is acting with a full 
set of virtues they are able to engage the right order (ius) of society with ease and natural 
affinity.   
The contemporary Anglo-American conceptualization of justice has been profoundly 
impacted by the Rawlsian appropriation of Kant, Rousseau, Locke, and Hobbes.  These 
philosophers were, in many ways, reacting against the political theories of Aristotle and Aquinas 
and the divine right of the sovereign that their theory of natural government underwrote.  In 
order for the legitimacy of a specific government or a form of government to be called into 
question one must propose a method by which governmental forms and specific governments 
arise.  Moving past the natural government theories of Aristotle and Aquinas, many empiricists 
and utilitarian theorists proposed that governments arise when various free agents come together 
and make a rational decision to cede individual rights in favor of common rights and 
responsibilities.  Through this ceding of individual rights the participants enter into a social 
contract that forms the basis of government.  Outlining the development of this theory, and its 
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impact on the concept of the natural order, is important for understanding our contemporary 
American view of justice. 
Thomas Hobbes was the first political theorist to provide a detailed social contract theory.  
In doing so, he was intentionally challenging the Aristotelian understanding of natural 
government.  Hobbes says, “I know that Aristotle in the first book of his Politics, for a 
foundation of his doctrine, makes men by nature, some more worthy to command, meaning the 
wiser sort…others to serve…”  But Hobbes argues that this is “not only against reason, but also 
against experience.  For there are very few so foolish, that had not rather govern themselves, that 
be governed by others.”119  He posits that there was a period of human existence before society 
in which human kind existed in a primitive state.  Hobbes proposes that in this pre-social, natural 
state there existed a “right of nature” that gives individual agents “the liberty…to use his own 
power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature, that is to say, of his own life, 
and consequently of doing anything which in his own judgment and reason he shall conceive to 
be the aptest means thereunto.”120  Although this means that every individual is sovereign over 
his own affairs, the state of nature and its attendant rights is imagined by Hobbes as being rather 
penurious and tumultuous.  He describes it thusly: 
Hereby it is manifest that during the time men live without a common power to keep 
them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war as is of 
every man against every man…In such condition there is no place for industry, because 
the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor 
use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no 
instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force; no knowledge of 
the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is 
worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man solitary, poor, 
nasty, brutish, and short.121  
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According to Hobbes, individuals in the state of nature were apolitical and asocial.  Each man 
was an individual sovereign over his own affairs; however, this not only severely limited the 
potential of the individual but also inevitably led to a conflict of interests.  Therefore, the various 
men of a region would gather together and intentionally cede some of their individual rights to 
the collective—forming a rational and deliberate contract.  This process of the corporate ceding 
of individual rights resulted in the establishment of the state, a sovereign entity, which could 
create laws to regulate social interactions.  Operating under a social contract human life was no 
longer “a war of all against all.”  Since the formation of the state, through the formation of the 
social contract, was a rational choice of the citizens of the state, and a collective act of will, the 
state was also an expression of the will of the people.  Just as the individuals in the state of 
nature had been individual sovereigns, and guided by self-interest, so states now acted in their 
self-interest in competition with each other.  Therefore, the inevitability of conflict present 
between individuals in the state of nature is transferred to the relationship between states, which 
were also bound to be in conflict because there was no sovereign over and above the state 
capable of imposing social contract laws.    
 John Locke was the second major social contract theorist.  In his Second Treatise of 
Government Locke presents a contract theory that contained profound differences from that of 
Hobbes.  In fact, Locke’s theory retains only the fundamental notion that individual persons in a 
state of nature would willingly form a political entity by ceding certain individual rights to the 
collective.  The state of nature imagined by Locke is much more optimistic in tone.  Locke 
believed that individuals in a state of nature are bound by the Law of Nature to respect the 
natural rights of other individuals.  This more auspicious view of the pre-social state of 
individuals is transferred to the relationships of political entities and Locke does not presume 
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inevitable and intractable conflict between persons or states.   Locke describes the process by 
which individuals cede natural liberties for the purpose of greater collective protection: 
Man being born, as has been proved, with a title to perfect freedom, and an uncontrolled 
enjoyment of all the rights and privileges of the law of nature, equally with any other 
man, or number of men in the world, hath by nature a power, not only to preserve his 
property, that is, his life, liberty and estate, against the injuries and attempts of other men; 
but to judge of, and punish the breaches of that law in others, as he is persuaded the 
offence deserves, even with death itself, in crimes where the heinousness of the fact, in 
his opinion, requires it. But because no political society can be, nor subsist, without 
having in itself the power to preserve the property, and in order thereunto, punish the 
offences of all those of that society; there, and there only is political society, where every 
one of the members hath quitted this natural power, resigned it up into the hands of the 
community in all cases that exclude him not from appealing for protection to the law 
established by it.122 
 
According to Locke, the primary impetus for forming the social contract is to extend the self-
preservation of life, liberty, and property.  This extension allows for greater protection against 
those who would willingly violate natural rights and thereby promises greater stability and 
serenity for citizens.  It transfers both the responsibility of protecting the citizens and punishing 
violators to the state.  The state arises specifically at the mandate of the people and the power of 
the state is derived from the consent of the people.  Locke’s theory of government enjoys such 
prominence in American thought that many of the principles contained therein are widely 
accepted uncritically as simple facts of the state.  The principle that political power arises from a 
mandate of the people is fundamental to the American political reality and permeates our concept 
of justice, rights, and their applications. 
 Jean-Jacques Rousseau is the final political philosopher important to mention with regard 
to American political thought, and its foundation in social contract theory.  In his most famous 
treatise, The Social Contract, Rousseau proposes a contract that is significantly different from 
that of either Hobbes or Locke.  Rousseau’s vision of the natural state, social contract, and 
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subsequent political reality had a positive note more similar to Locke, but the functioning of the 
state was envisioned differently.  For Rousseau the contract forms the basis for a set of political 
rights based on unlimited popular sovereignty.  The rights attributable in civil society do not 
arise from nature but must be “founded on conventions.”123  The conventions that give warrant to 
the civil rights necessary for flourishing are established according to popular consensus.  
Rousseau argues that citizens cannot pursue their true interests in isolation or self-absorption, i.e. 
as an egoist, but that they must subordinate themselves to the law created by the citizenry as a 
collective.  Rousseau declares that the social contract can be “reduced to the following terms: 
Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the 
general will; and in a body we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole.”124  The 
process by which the individuals put themselves and their powers under the direction of the 
general will must be facilitated at times by force.  If individuals, or a subgroup, lapses back into 
egoism and disobeys the leadership, they will be compelled to act in accordance with what has 
been decided through the collectivity.  Thus, the law, inasmuch as it is created by the people 
acting as a body, is not a limitation of individual freedom, but its expression.  Because laws 
represent the restraints of civil freedom, they represent the transformation from the state of 
nature into civil society.  In this sense, according to Rousseau, the law is a civilizing force, and 
therefore the laws that govern a people helped to mold their character. 
 In our discussion of justice, and the development of social justice, the important points to 
highlight within the contract theories are: 1) the state of nature is not fundamentally social but 
individual; 2) political entities are formed when individuals freely and willingly cede their 
natural rights for the purpose of establishing new rights in accordance with collective values;    
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3) this process is both rational and voluntary; and 4) individual laws, and the structure of social 
order, are an expression of the values ensconced in the social contract.  These points are pertinent 
to our discussion because they not only serve as the basis for much of American political 
thought, but they are also in intentional opposition to the natural governmental theory espoused 
by Aristotle and Aquinas.  Since in almost all articulations justice is the virtue through which 
individuals relate to each other within the social construct, the theoretical framework through 
which this construct is understood will have a profound influence on how the virtue operates.  
This is not to say that one articulation is correct, simply that each theory will manifest different 
characteristics.  The social contract theory has, at its heart, a reasoned and willful decision to 
cede certain natural rights in order to gain new communal rights.  The social order is an 
expression of the rational will of the people.  Justice is, therefore, a virtue that is an expression of 
this rational will.  This is quite different from the natural government of Aristotle and Aquinas in 
which the social order is an expression of divine will and a result of final causation.  For 
Aquinas, God is the ultimate source of all governance and in him alone do intellect and will 
operate without distinction.  Human governance is a participation in this divine governance and 
justice is the virtue of the will through which one intends the right social order.  And the social 
order is a partially received and organic reality in which the individual participates through 
virtue.  Whereas, for social contract theorists the fundamental reality behind the formation of a 
political entity is an act of the human agents in which there is no distinction between the intellect 
and will.  The fundamental social virtue of justice is both intellectual and voluntary and the 
relationship of the individual to the collective is one of critical rational choice.  Because the 
causation is different in the two theories, the attendant virtues function differently. 
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3.2   Justice according to Kant 
 
Another major influence upon contemporary understanding of justice is the ethical theory 
of Kant.  For our conversation, the three pertinent characteristics of Kantian ethics are that: 1) it 
is deontological and justifies norms of action in terms of rational principles rather than 
teleological ends; 2) it is formalistic in that it does not explicate natures and substantive moral 
ideas, but provides a neutral procedure for rational choice; and 3) it is universalistic in that its 
principles are meant to be valid in any human situation as opposed to a specific culture or 
historical moment.125  Kant bequeathed an ethical theory, and a theory of justice, that was at odds 
with both the natural philosophy of Aristotle and Aquinas, and the social contract theories of the 
empiricists and utilitarians.   
By the well-being of a state must not be understood the welfare of its citizens and their 
happiness; for happiness can perhaps come to them more easily and as they would like it 
to in a state of nature (as Rousseau asserts) or even under a despotic government.  By the 
well-being of a state is understood, instead, that condition in which its constitution 
conforms most fully to principles of right; it is that condition which reason, by 
categorical imperative, makes it obligatory for us to strive after.126 
 
Through Kant’s outright denial of the ordering power of natural happiness or human flourishing 
one can immediately ascertain that his method of ethical discourse is, in many ways, antithetical 
to the theory presented by Aquinas.  Similar to the social contract theorists, in his description of 
moral reasoning Kant combined the powers of the intellect and the will.  This combination, once 
again, leads to an understanding of justice that is radically different from that of Aquinas’s virtue 
of iustitia.  The reason that Kant eliminated the distinction between intellect and will in his 
account of practical reason is that he eliminated the concept of final causation by which the agent 
is drawn towards the good through connaturality.  Westberg states: 
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Kant did combine intellect and will in his account of practical reason, but separated them 
from any teleological view of reality and provided the motivation for practical reason in 
the notion of duty to law.  With natural appetite removed in the Kantian agent, intellect 
and will combine to functions of both internal and external principles of action.127 
 
The elimination of final causation, and the collapsing of the distinction between the intellect and 
the will, means that the virtues that attend social intercourse become deeply rational and critical 
in nature.  For Kant, all principles of moral reasoning, including the reasoning of justice, are 
formed in a manner that is context independent, and then subsequently applied by moral agents 
within circumstantial situations.  In Kant’s theory justice is a hybrid, deeply rational virtue by 
which the fairness in human exchanges and interactions is judged according to the categorical 
imperative. 
3.3   The Rawlsian veil of ignorance 
 
In his Theory of Justice Rawls builds on the presuppositions of Kant and provides a 
procedure for assessing principles of justice that is both neutral with respect to the different 
conceptions of the good and independent of the values and interests of particular groups or 
communities.  Rawls begins with the statement, “Justice is the first virtue of social 
institution.”128  He says that a good society is one structured according to principles of justice.  
Rawls asserts that existing theories of justice, developed in the field of philosophy, are 
inadequate: “My guiding aim is to work out A Theory of Justice that is a viable alternative to 
these doctrines which have long dominated our philosophical tradition.”129  He emphasizes that 
the principles of justice should not take into account any possible differences among individuals.  
Moral reasoning is to be guided by choosing principles of justice from behind a “veil of 
ignorance.”  This point of view, which he calls the “original position,” is intended to ensure that 
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the principles of justice selected are intentionally ignorant of historical and societal contexts, 
including history, society, race, sex, class, wealth, assets, abilities, values, or conceptions of the 
good.  Justice, therefore, is a virtue that seeks to guide moral reasoning according to an absolute 
claim of universal equality.  For Rawls, justice is not an inclination of the will to act in support 
of the social distinctions that are manifestations of reason’s articulation of the common good 
according to some rational apprehension of human nature.  Rather, it is a virtue with a deeply 
rational character, by which absolute and radical equality is made manifest in social order. 
The Kantian-Rawlsian approach is, of course, quite different from the way in which 
Aquinas understands the virtue of iustitia to be operating.  For Rawls there can be principles of 
justice which function specifically to critique and reform social structures according to a 
fundamental conviction of universal and absolute equality.  For Aquinas the primary function of 
iustitia is to protect and ensure the stability of society by reinforcing the need to give to each 
person according to their relative position in society, with specific regard to the very differences 
to which Kant and Rawls were blind, and to express a particular view of the common good.  For 
Aquinas iustitia is a fundamentally conservative virtue that preserves the social order.  Since it is 
located in the will, it is not the proper virtue to execute social critique or change.  Although the 
dedication of the will toward seeking that which “gives others their due” is an integral part of 
any rational exploration of social structure, it plays only a supporting role.  It is clear that our 
concept of justice has changed significantly, and has been expanded to include deeply rational 
components.   We must be aware of these changes if we are to successfully understand Aquinas’ 
theory and appropriate his virtue structure in pursuit of the goals often associated with 
contemporary social justice.   
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3.4   The evolution of social justice 
 
The Kantian-Rawlsian impact on our current understanding of justice is not the only 
linguistic evolution that needs attention for a contemporary Catholic appropriation of Aquinas.  
One of the ways in which justice is commonly discussed in Catholic circles, and certainly among 
Jesuits, is within the context of promoting social justice.  The social encyclicals of the Church 
and the documents of the Society of Jesus both demonstrate the evolution of the phrase “social 
justice” during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  Indubitably, the phrase has an 
evolutionary pathway that is as complex as that of justice simpliciter.  However, the history of 
the phrase demonstrates the deep irony that “social justice” arose in the context of a 
philosophical struggle against the utilitarian, empirical, and deontological methods of the 
nineteenth century attributable to the same political philosophers previously mentioned in this 
chapter.  And if one looks at the early origin of the phrase, the deep compatibility of the 
foundational principles of social justice and the ethical theory of Aquinas comes into view. 
 In their landmark article in the Journal of Markets and Morality, Stefano Solari and 
Daniele Corrado trace the evolution of the concept of social justice as it emerged in the Society 
of Jesus.130   According to Solari, in the nineteenth century, the Thomistic tradition of natural law 
based on practical reasonableness was “reproposed by Jesuits to counter individualistic 
utilitarianism and materialistic liberalism.”131  I would add that the Jesuits were also struggling 
against the highly abstract homines noumena of Kant and his focus on equally abstract duty.  The 
mostly Jesuit natural law theorists were arguing against what they considered to be the 
philosophical fiction of total self-determination and the historical fiction of the social contract.  
They insisted that the human person is at least partially circumstantially determined.  In addition 
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to this partial determination, the circumstances in which a human person is embedded provide 
goods and meaning beyond the capacity of the individual.  The relationship between people and 
their environment is organic and connatural.  Within this environment a person is able to operate 
within a framework that assists in knowing the right thing to do.  There exists an organic 
relationship between the good, the right, rights, duties, and morality—all of which occur within 
the context of divine providence and oriented towards the good.  Solari states that Aquinas 
proposed a legal framework based on “right reason and on the possibility of discovering and 
communicating what is good and, consequently, what is just.”132  For Aquinas—and the natural 
law theorists—duties, obligations, and rights do not emerge from pure rational deliberation in 
isolation, but they arise from the rational necessity of some means to achieve the common good 
through which individuals are connected by nature.  Solari states that duty is not separable from 
rights because “the good objectively connects them in a relationship.”133   
The term “social justice” arose from the context of the nineteenth century Jesuits’ 
insistence that the organic reality in which a person is located necessarily connects the entire set 
of causation—including the final causes associated with flourishing and happiness.  Against the 
total self-determination implied in individualistic theories, the Jesuits were arguing that the 
human reality is experienced within the degrees of freedom proper to human nature and that 
freedom is maximized when it is exercised in accord with a rational grasp of the truth which is 
oriented towards the good.  Society does not emerge from the independent rational/volitional 
decisions of individuals, but emerges as a “necessary consequence of human nature.”  Solari 
argues that, for the natural law theorists, the foundation of human society is not based upon 
deliberate acts of individual wills submitting to the conglomerate will, but based upon the moral 
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order which is “oriented to obtaining truth and good.”134  Solari argues that Jesuit Father Luigi 
Taparelli d’Azeglio “was one of the most important scholars who renewed Thomistic thought 
and was largely responsible for its adoption as the official social philosophy of the Church.”135   
Thomas Burke, in his article on the “Origins of Social Justice”, traces the development of 
the concept of social justice from the writings of Taparelli d’Azeglio to the present.  According 
to Burke, the term “social justice” was coined by Taparelli in 1843.  Taparelli used the term in 
the Thomistic fashion according to which justice is the virtue by which the social order was 
protected because by it the virtuous person would give to other people according to their proper 
place within a naturally structured society.  Although Taparelli, like Aquinas, did not explicitly 
endorse one schema of social organization over another, he presumed that the social order arose 
out of natural differentiation between people.  God has given all people the desire to seek the 
supreme good and to do so in a cooperative and social manner.  Taparelli openly rejects both the 
Lockean principle of equality and what he calls the “historical fiction of the social contract.”136 
He posits that there is natural authority according to relative prowess:   
Authority…arises because some men are naturally braver, more competent, more 
intelligent, wealthier, or better endowed with the qualities of leadership than others.  
When a particular authority grows so strong that it has no superior it attains to 
sovereignty, and if it exists in a stable territory it becomes a state.  The right to govern a 
state…belongs to the person who has established order in it.137 
 
For Taparelli, social justice requires that one recognize that natural inequalities exist among 
people and to accept that it is due to these inequalities that natural government develops.  Social 
justice, therefore, is a conservative virtue by which these structures of government are 
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recognized as having legitimacy and each person supports the social structure according to his or 
her place within the society ordered—i.e. made right—by the exercise of authority.   
These concerns voiced by Taparelli entered official Catholic discourse with the 
publication of the great social encyclical Rerum Novarum by one of Taparelli’s students, Pope 
Leo XIII, in 1891:  
It must be first of all recognized that the condition of things inherent in human affairs 
must be borne with, for it is impossible to reduce civil society to one dead level. 
Socialists may in that intent do their utmost, but all striving against nature is in vain. 
There naturally exist among mankind manifold differences of the most important kind; 
people differ in capacity, skill, health, strength; and unequal fortune is a necessary result 
of unequal condition. Such unequality is far from being disadvantageous either to 
individuals or to the community. Social and public life can only be maintained by means 
of various kinds of capacity for business and the playing of many parts; and each man, as 
a rule, chooses the part which suits his own peculiar domestic condition.138 
  
According to Burke, the ironic turn in the history of the phrase “social justice” occurred 
when it was connected to Taparelli’s economic theory—which was also fundamentally 
conservative.  Taparelli defended what he considered the more “communitarian economics” of 
Catholicism against what he considered the “individualistic economics” of Protestant countries.  
Taparelli argues that economic structures must exist for the advancement of the common good 
and not for personal gain or private accumulation of wealth.  Although Taparelli never uses the 
phrase “social justice” with respect to his economic theory, the two theories, both fundamentally 
conservative in his context, were amalgamated as they were appropriated.  The phrase “social 
justice” itself was first used officially by the Church forty years after the publication of Rerum 
Novarum, in 1931, when the encyclical Quadragesimo Anno was published to celebrate the 
earlier Encyclical Letter.  In this document, somewhat ironically in light of the background in 
Taparelli’s views, Pope Pius XI uses the phrase “social justice” explicitly as a virtue by which 
                                                
138 Pope Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum, §17.  The choice of the word “unequality” as opposed to “inequality” is present 
in the official English translation. 
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social and economic structures are evaluated according to a principle of radical equality and 
motivated towards an equitable distribution of resources among the citizenry.139 
Still, in order that what he so happily initiated may be solidly established, that what 
remains to be done may be accomplished, and that even more copious and richer benefits 
may accrue to the family of mankind, two things are especially necessary: reform of 
institutions and correction of morals…To each, therefore, must be given his own share of 
goods, and the distribution of created goods, which, as every discerning person knows, is 
laboring today under the gravest evils due to the huge disparity between the few 
exceedingly rich and the unnumbered propertyless, must be effectively called back to and 
brought into conformity with the norms of the common good, that is, social justice.140 
 
This Encyclical does not suggest that the radical equality that flows from universal human 
dignity gives rise to perfectly equal distribution of goods and resources.  Pius XI intimates that 
the method of distribution found in a given society must, according to the norm of social justice, 
respect the fundamental equality of all human persons and provide sufficient access to the goods 
and resources of the society such that all citizens have access to what is necessary for 
flourishing.  According to Pius XI, social justice is the virtue by which the modes of distributive 
and commutative justice are evaluated and critiqued. 
In Faith that Does Justice, published in 1977, Jesuit Father David Hollenbach describes 
the way in which the concept of social justice developed and is related to the Thomistic 
categories of distributive and commutative justice.  Hollenbach first rearticulates the Thomistic 
categories according to a corrected version of the common good in which there is assumed 
radical equality and dignity among all human persons.  He then describes the third “mode” of 
justice, which he calls social justice.   
The third modality of justice (social) concerns institutionalized patterns of mutual action 
and interdependence which are necessary to bring about the realization of distributive 
justice…it refers to the obligations of all citizens to aid in the creation of patterns of 
societal organization and activity which are essential both for the protection of minimal 
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human rights and for the creation of mutuality and participation by all in social 
life...social justice is a political virtue.141 
 
For Hollenbach, the virtue of social justice is a modality of the broader virtue in which the values 
of a specific conceptualization of the common good—based on radical equality—are practically 
applied to society through the critique of social structures.  This is a clear shift in the 
understanding of justice within the Thomistic tradition.  Despite the overall Thomistic 
framework in which this new virtue is described by Hollenbach, it has moved beyond Aquinas’ 
concept of iustitia as a virtue that orients the will to act in accordance with the present social 
structure.  In Hollenbach’s view, social justice is the way in which the virtue of justice motivates 
prudential reasoning to act with a specific critical apparatus and with a specific egalitarian 
agenda.   
In recent years the concept of social justice has continued to evolve.  In some circles it 
has become almost exclusively identified with a specific form of social critique in which the 
economic structures of society, and the legal and governmental apparatus that support them, are 
evaluated and challenged according to a fundamental conviction of radical equality of persons. 
Social justice has evolved to accommodate the hybrid nature of Kantian-Rawlsian justice that 
possesses a critical, and therefore rational, component.  This can be seen in the statement of a 
recent General Congregation of the Society of Jesus with regard to our dedication to social 
justice: 
It is becoming more and more evident that the structures of society are among the 
principal formative influences in our world, shaping people’s ideas and feelings, shaping 
their most intimate desires and aspirations; in a word, shaping mankind itself.  The 
struggle to transform these structures in the interest of the spiritual and material liberation 
of fellow human beings is intimately connected to the work of evangelization.  This is not 
to say, of course, that we can ever afford to neglect the direct apostolate to individuals, to 
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those who are the victims of the injustice of social structures as well as to those who bear 
some responsibility or influence over them.142 
 
In the decades following Hollenbach’s definition, social justice became more intimately 
connected to a specific type of economic critique based on the communitarian principles of 
economics outlined by Taparelli and infused with a good dose of Marxist philosophy.  One can 
hear the echoes of Hegelian philosophy, and its Marxist response, in the declarations of the Jesuit 
General Congregation: 
The struggle for justice has a progressive and gradually unfolding historic character, as it 
confronts the changing needs of specific peoples, cultures, and times.  Previous 
congregations have called attention to the need to work for structural changes in the 
socioeconomic and political orders as an important dimension of the promotion of 
justice.143 
 
Combining the Congregation’s dedication to analyzing and understanding the gradually 
unfolding historical character of justice with a specific interest in the material modes of 
production produces a Christian appropriation of Marxism that allows for critique of political 
and economic realities according to reason.  This combination has served as a powerful and 
controversial method of practical theology for several decades now.  The effect of political 
theology and liberation theology, two of the systematic manifestations of social justice, has been 
felt throughout the world and has produced exciting changes.   
However, the controversy has not only marginalized liberation theology, but has started 
to erode commitment to the principles of social justice in young Catholics and even among many 
young Jesuits.  Part of the controversy results from the suspicion many Catholics and Jesuits 
have with respect to the Marxist critique.  Furthermore, part of the controversy extends from the 
fact that the term “justice” is operating in two very different ways.  For many Roman Catholic 
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theologians and practitioners the term “justice” operates in a manner that is deeply informed by 
Aquinas’ conservative usage in which the virtue acts exclusively upon the will for the protection 
of society.  For others, the contemporary American usage dominates in which the virtue is 
simultaneously volitional and rational and endowed with profound critical capabilities.  This 
leads to ideological conflicts, based on intuitions derived from semantics, that are not necessary 
if the goals are discussed within the context of the common good.  Therefore, a contemporary 
appropriation of Aquinas must be very careful to respect the limitations of iustitia within his 
system and to expand the scope of the conversation to include other virtues besides iustitia.   
Further exacerbating the tensions related to the use of the term “social justice” is the fact 
that there are additional characteristics, beyond the aspect of structural analysis and critique, that 
have become intimately associated with the contemporary hybrid virtue.  These additional 
aspects include such things as: 1) the preferential option for the poor, 2) a commitment to living 
in solidarity with the poor, 3) respect for the dignity of the human person created in the image of 
God, 4) assuring access to the economic and social rights necessary for life and well-being, 5) 
guaranteeing the freedoms necessary for gaining these goods, and 6) recognition of the impact of 
globalization.144  While discussing social justice the General Congregation states: 
Our faith in Christ Jesus and our mission to proclaim the Gospel demand of us a 
commitment to promote justice and to enter into solidarity with the voiceless and the 
powerless.  This commitment will move us seriously to verse ourselves in the complex 
problems which they face in their lives, then to identify and assume our own 
responsibilities to society.145 
 
This litany of associated qualities, which has become so intimately connected to the promotion 
of social justice, contains some of the most beautiful and exciting practical theology of the 
contemporary church.  It serves as a consistent source of excitement and apostolic activity within 
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the Church.  The apostolic activity that flows out of the contemporary commitment to social 
justice and its attending characteristics can be easily perceived in the campus ministry efforts of 
Catholic and Jesuit high schools and universities, including Boston College and BC High.  
However, in Catholic circles, there often arises a perception of tension between the practical 
theology associated with social justice and the traditional theology that draws deeply from the 
virtue theory of Aquinas.  To resolve this tension, and to allow for greater exchange of ideas 
between traditional and progressive ethical commitments, we shall examine how the 
constellation of principles commonly associated with contemporary social justice relates to the 
broader virtue theory of Aquinas.  One will only be frustrated if one looks narrowly to Aquinas’ 
theory of iustitia to find the theoretical framework upon which a commitment to social justice 
can stand.  For Aquinas, the purview of the virtue of iustitia is limited to the will, and it simply 
does not possess the rational faculties necessary to accomplish the analysis that is essential to 
contemporary social justice.  However, as stated previously, Aquinas’ virtue theory considered 
as a whole does provide a theoretical framework in which the issues of social justice can be 
addressed, but it does so employing a different rubric.  The contemporary convictions of radical 
equality and individual rights belong to the Thomistic domain of theoretical reasoning assisted 
by wisdom.  The commitment to the preferential option for the poor belongs to the Thomistic 
virtue of charity.  The critique of social structures according to contemporary economic theories 
and sensibilities belongs to the Thomistic domain of practical reasoning assisted by prudence.  In 
Aquinas’ language, the faith that does justice, inasmuch as it acts in a critical and constructive 
fashion, is more closely associated with the virtue of prudence than iustitia.  Furthermore, in 
Aquinas’ language, the faith that does justice, inasmuch as it seeks the common good and the 
will of God within social relationships, is a faith that acts with holistic virtue. 
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CHAPTER 4  AQUINAS’ VIRTUES AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 
 
4.1   Integrating social justice into Aquinas’ virtue theory 
 
The evolution of the contemporary American political theory, as cursorily described in 
the last chapter, has contributed to the development of a structure of justice in which rights and 
duties are bequeathed upon individuals, independent of their relative social status.  This 
development has been beneficial in producing peaceful, pluralistic societies like ours.  However, 
at the same time, the Kantian-Rawlsian concept of justice tends to isolate the individual moral 
agents and detach their moral reasoning from their natural environment.  The moral landscape is 
marked by individual agents, acting in a critical fashion from a point of almost Cartesian 
isolation, who focus upon positive law and how it defines individual rights and duties, without 
giving a sufficient theoretical basis for how they are organically related to the society.  Although 
there indubitably are benefits to this theory of justice, it also has drawbacks.  Kant and Rawls 
deliberately removed teleological considerations from their social theories.  This produced 
several results.  First, the individual agent was given greater freedom and self-determination with 
respect to the society.  Second, the removal of teleology stripped the agent of the comforts and 
constraints of final causation, as experienced immediately in the common good and found 
ultimately in God.  Third, when final causation is eliminated from the philosophical scene, the 
distinction between the intellect and the will collapses, since the will is the faculty by which final 
causes are made effective in the agent.  In this case the virtues associated with the will, including 
justice, are largely appropriated to the intellect.  While this new hybrid virtue of justice is 
capable of supporting the contemporary set of individual rights and duties, and endows the agent 
with profound critical faculties, the question remains as to how the individual is related, for good 
and for bad, to the community.  This limitation of deontological methods and utilitarianism is 
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most clearly visible in the domain of social justice.  The Kantian-Rawlsian hybrid virtue of 
justice struggles to support many of the issues surrounding social justice.   
This limitation is partially due to the fact that social justice grew out of a natural law 
perspective and, therefore, draws from its pool of definitions and distinctions.  But the main 
reason why the hybrid virtue fails to adequately support the concerns associated with social 
justice is because contemporary social justice specifically examines the relationship of the 
individual to his or her full environment.  This is why a contemporary appropriation of Aquinas 
is beneficial in advancing the cause of social justice.  Aquinas, and the natural law theorists that 
derive from him, insists that the human person is a part of the natural environment, by which he 
or she is at least partially circumstantially determined.  The circumstances in which a human 
person is embedded not only provide goods and meaning beyond the capacity of the individual 
but they also introduce blindness, sin, and unreflected biases that attenuate the freedom and 
effectiveness of the individual.  Aquinas’ ethical theory is particularly adept in supporting a 
commitment to social justice because it not only provides a theoretical framework through which 
the agent’s psychology is connected to the environment, as described in chapter two, but it also 
explains how the individual becomes socialized into structures of sin—a source of particular 
interest in social justice.   
However, a narrow focus upon Aquinas’ virtue of iustitia will not provide the theoretical 
framework necessary for advancing social justice.   Not surprisingly, one has to consider the 
human person operating with a full set of intellectual and volitional virtues to arrive at a 
theoretical framework capable of advancing social justice and the associated concerns, like the 
preferential option for the poor.  As opposed to a narrow focus upon rights and duties within a 
specific commitment to positive law, Aquinas restrains his approval of these details in political 
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theory and, instead, proposes a theory of natural law in which such things as individual 
privileges and duties can be understood as flowing from the social order.  For Aquinas the 
natural law is the human participation in divine law such that their place within creation can be 
understood and their path towards flourishing can be discerned.  Natural law is “natural” in two 
senses.  First, it is natural because it is rooted in human nature and its moral precepts conform 
with and help to fulfill the kinds of beings we are.  Human nature is such that it is drawn to the 
goods necessary for flourishing and happiness by a well-functioning will.  Second, it is natural in 
that it is discernible by natural reason.  The human intellect, by its own power and apart from 
special revelation, can discover at least its most essential truths.  The intellect and the will must, 
therefore, be acting at their full potential for a person to be an excellent moral agent, and this 
presumes that the major virtues all be present and functioning in concert. 
4.2   Charity and the preferential option for the poor 
 
The preferential option for the poor is a theological principle that is closely related to 
social justice.  Not only has it been intimately associated with social justice during its 
development in the Society of Jesus, but it serves as one of the primary driving forces behind the 
reforms and critiques that flow from a commitment to social justice.  Although Aquinas does 
address the poor in his discussion of iustitia, and touches on the topic several times when 
addressing the virtues associated with iustitia, he does not have a developed treatment of the 
poor in this section.  Aquinas does insist that, since people have a right to having the basic 
necessities of life, not only do people in extreme need have the natural right to take these 
necessities from people who have an abundance, but in symmetry, whatever a person has in 
abundance is owed to the poor for their sustenance.146  Aquinas states that, “since man is a social 
animal, one man naturally owes another whatever is necessary for the preservation of human 
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society.”147  Nevertheless, the limitations of iustitia in meeting the needs of the poor come into 
focus when one considers that Aquinas states that iustitia is observed “towards all, whereas 
liberality cannot extend to all.  Again liberality which gives of a man’s own is based on iustitia, 
whereby one renders to each man what is his.”148  Although a person is called to exercise the 
virtues associated with iustitia, liberality and generosity, with what belongs to him or her, 
according to iustitia the person is entitled to receive from society according to social status: 
Consequently in distributive iustitia a person receives all the more of the common goods, 
according as he holds a more prominent position in the community.  This prominence in 
an aristocratic community is gauged according to virtue, in an oligarchy according to 
wealth, in a democracy according to liberty, and in various ways according to various 
forms of community.149 
 
Therefore, iustitia does not, in itself, provide a sufficient theoretical basis for a preferential 
option for the poor or a commitment to extending to the poor a type of systematic aid that would 
improve their condition—beyond that which is necessary for sustaining life. 
The virtue that is capable of sustaining the preferential option for the poor is, indubitably, 
the architectonic virtue of charity.  Charity is the habit by which the spiritual person “has an 
inclination to judge aright of all things according to the Divine rules; and it is in conformity with 
these that he pronounces judgment through the gift of wisdom: even as the just man pronounces 
judgment through the virtue of prudence conformably with the ruling of the law.”150  It is 
through charity, acting in concert with wisdom and prudence, that a person orders things in a 
way that is pleasing to God and in accord with revelation.  Charity is the basis for a critique of 
social structures and human laws because it compares these to the rule of love.151 
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Charity is the virtue by which the human agent is in relationship to God.  Charity not only 
allows us to intend God as an object of our will and intellect; but it also is the power through 
which we are made aware of this possibility, drawn to this possibility, and realize this possibility.  
Charity is the human participation in divine love such that the human person is drawn into the 
interpersonal dynamics of the Triune God.  Charity is God-oriented, but it does not function in 
spiritual isolation.  Just as the love that is expressed within the Trinity overflows to form creation 
and to draw creation into God, the love that we have for God draws others into itself.  In this 
way, the interpersonal dynamics of love and charity that we experience with other people 
become incorporated into the very nature of God, and seen as a participation in the inner life of 
God.  Aquinas states that we love people as an extension of the love that we have for God: 
Now by friendship a thing is loved in two ways: first, as the friend for whom we have 
friendship, and to whom we wish good things; secondly, as the good which we wish to a 
friend.   It is in the latter and not in the former way that charity is loved out of charity, 
because charity is the good which we desire for all those whom we love out of charity.152 
 
In the next question, Aquinas continues: 
 
Therefore God ought to be loved chiefly and before all (principaliter et maxime) out of 
charity: for He is loved as the cause of happiness, whereas our neighbor is loved as 
receiving together with us a share of happiness from Him.”153   
 
Aquinas is not arguing for a temporal or didactic priority.  He is not suggesting that in the order 
of experience a person comes to know and love God first, and then extends this knowledge and 
affection to other human agents.  He is arguing for a metaphysical priority, on the same basis that 
he reversed Aristotle’s ordering of the virtues.  God is loved first because God has loved us first 
and it is only through God’s drawing us to goodness and happiness that we learn to love others.  
We always act towards specific ends, and the principle ends of all human acts are “God, self, and 
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others, since we do whatever we do for the sake of one of these.”154  It is in the one and same act 
whereby we love God, and whereby we love our neighbor.155 Aquinas believes that we love all 
our neighbors with the same love of charity because they are related to God as our common 
good.156  Since the good of all human beings necessarily includes other people, to whom they are 
connected through the common good, the love of friendship which attracts people to their 
fulfillment in God necessarily extends to other people as well.  David Gallagher states: 
According to Thomas, it belongs essentially to the love of friendship to take as one’s own 
good the good of the beloved.  Thus, one’s own good can be expanded, so to speak, when 
one has a love of friendship for another person.  One loves one’s own good precisely in 
loving the good of the other person for that person’s sake (Ia IIae, q. 28 aa. 2-3).  This 
happens especially in the case of loving God.  If a person loves God with the love of 
friendship (caritas) then the good of God becomes his own good and his beatitude 
consists in possessing (by the visio beatifica) this good.  The will’s natural inclination to 
beatitude does not lock a person inside himself; rather, it draws him out of himself and 
into the possession of a larger good, which, through the love of friendship, has become 
his own.157 
 
It is common for people to state that, for Aquinas, justice is the virtue through which the moral 
agent becomes connected to other people.  This is partially true in Aristotle’s theory, but it is 
simply false with respect to Aquinas’.  As was indicated previously, in Aquinas’ account, the 
person is connected to other people through charity, wisdom, and prudence before iustitia is even 
mentioned.  Iustitia describes how one should act within the structures defined by positive law 
within a legitimate social structure.  Charity describes how one should act towards any human 
person.  Therefore, charity is the virtue that connects the agent outside the formal structures.  
This includes domestic relationships, unprotected immigrants, those on the legal margins, and 
the poor.   
 In what I think is the best concise presentation of how the preferential option for the poor 
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connects to Aquinas’ virtue theory, Stephen Pope argues that “As a contemporary expression of 
Christian love for the poor, the preferential option provides an ethical language suited to 
generating profound commitment to social justice.”158  According to Pope, when charity is 
operating in a person it gives rise to “internal acts of benevolence and, when possible and 
appropriate, external acts of beneficence toward any person in need.”159   Almsgiving and other 
acts of generosity given to those in need are given "out of compassion and for God's sake."160  
Speaking of the works that naturally flow out of charity Pope writes: 
Corporal works of mercy proceed from genuine love of the poor, without expectation of 
reciprocity or temporal rewards from God.  Mercy, as an expression of charity, involves 
not simply material support for the poor but more importantly the "love of friendship." 
Mercy includes a giving of self that involves affective union and communication as well as 
benevolence —as St. Paul put it, "And if I bestow all my goods to feed the poor... but have 
not love, it profits me nothing."  Charity calls us to be friends with the poor rather than to 
see them as mere objects of our beneficence.161  
 
By the virtue of charity a person is called to become a friend to those who are in need, not simply 
to condescend to help them.  This entails becoming aware of the needs of the poor beyond their 
simple place in society.  It means associating with the poor and understanding their 
circumstances, experiences, and feelings.  Charity does not replace iustitia, or substitute for 
iustitia, it simply exceeds it.  Pope declares that specific acts of charity “may go beyond the strict 
requirements of justice but they may never legitimately substitute for the latter.”162  Charity, as 
the primary virtue of the will, draws the person to a standard of ethical behavior that outshines 
that required by iustitia alone.  When charity operates as the form of the virtues it orients them 
towards ultimate ends.  Iustitia is the virtue by which the will is moved to render unto another 
person what they are due according to law and in proportion to their relative dignity within the 
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social order.163  Charity is a virtue by which the will becomes oriented towards God and desirous 
of drawing all things towards God.  When iustitia is transformed by charity, or working together 
with charity, then the principles of distribution shift to favor proportionating according to need as 
opposed to status.  This is how the virtue of charity gives rise to the preferential option for the 
poor as a principle of iustitia operating under grace.  Since the good of the individual is tied up 
with and reliant upon the good of the society, and since the end of all things is perfect happiness 
in God, special attention must be paid to those who are the farthest from flourishing so that all 
may advance towards God.  In this way the preferential option for the poor can be seen as a 
mode of iustitia in which charity shines forth.  In an earlier article, Pope discusses what the 
combination of charity and iustitia produce with respect to the preferential option for the poor: 
As a principle of distributive justice, the preferential option rests upon the belief that 
moral concern should be proportioned to need, where "need" can be interpreted to include 
poverty, but also vulnerability, powerlessness, marginality, etc. Other things being equal, 
Christians should assign priority to addressing the needs of the poor and otherwise 
powerless rather than to the needs of others because the former are by definition less 
capable of providing for themselves than are the latter.  As a principle of justice rather 
than simple charity, this preference is not only morally justifiable, it is morally required.  
Most important, empowerment of the powerless is pursued so that all "parts" are able to 
participate properly in the life of the whole community.164 
 
When iustitia is operating under the influence of charity it becomes clear that individuals have a 
responsibility to care for those who are in the greatest need and for those who are not, of their 
own power, able to make full use of the resources at hand.  The preferential option for the poor 
does not stand as a principle of iustitia simpliciter, but is grounded in a more comprehensive 
theory of the common good that is sufficiently robust as to warrant the disproportionate emphasis 
upon those who have the greatest need.165  This brings us to a consideration of how a 
contemporary appropriation of Aquinas makes use of his theory of the common good. 
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4.3   Wisdom and the articulation of the common good 
 
According to Aquinas, the virtue through which the natures of things are deduced and 
contemplated is wisdom.  Additionally, it is through the virtue of wisdom that the relationships 
between things are evaluated. Wisdom is the virtue through which the intellect comprehends 
things that are not known at once, but are known only by means of reason’s extensive inquiry.166  
Through wisdom one is able to incorporate the knowledge and understanding of other people 
contained within tradition, including religious tradition and scripture, and one is able to order and 
prioritize the value of goods in relation to one another and to tradition.  Wisdom is able to 
consider objects in relation to higher goods, highest causes, and natural ends.   
Therefore it is according to wisdom that the social order is established and the 
relationships within the social structure are theoretically based.  The gift of wisdom, operating 
under the influence of charity in the mode of grace, allows for the human person to order things 
with respect to the ultimate good—God.  Aquinas states: 
Now to love God above all things is natural to man and to every nature, not only rational 
but irrational, and even to inanimate nature according to the manner of love which can 
belong to each creature.  And the reason of this is that it is natural to all to seek and love 
things according as they are naturally fit.167 
 
However, natural wisdom is sufficient for ordering things according to the highest relative good 
of the person, e.g. common good.  In order to advance the cause of social justice the first step is 
to articulate a vision of the common good that contains contemporary values within it and 
reflects the current prioritization of goods according to theoretical reasoning operating under the 
influence of wisdom. 
Among the contemporary ethicists using this approach is Jesuit Fr. David Hollenbach.  
He operates out of a conviction that social change, and social justice, is best advanced through 
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persuasive articulations of the common good, that are then translated into social action through 
practical reasoning operating with prudence.  However, he laments, “Today…the idea of the 
common good is in trouble.  John Rawls speaks for many observers in the West today when he 
says that the pluralism of the contemporary landscape makes it impossible to envision a social 
good on which all can agree.”168  The Rawlsian perspective on justice, in which persons are 
viewed in a manner that eliminates the circumstances of their lives, has eclipsed the idea of the 
common good in American society, and for some has possibly even eliminated any hope for a 
consistent commitment to a sense of a common good.  Hollenbach asserts: 
This is the intellectual and theoretical challenge to the common good today: diversity of 
visions of the good life makes it difficult or even impossible to attain a shared vision of 
the common good…This is the practical challenge: pursuit of a common good as 
envisioned by Aristotle, Aquinas, and Ignatius must be abandoned as a practical social 
objective incompatible with modern freedoms.169 
 
Therefore, according to Hollenbach, the first task is the theoretical task of articulating the 
common good in such a way that it can have broad appeal and serve as a motivating force for 
social change.  This is accomplished through theoretical reasoning operating by the power of 
wisdom.  The second task is to use this articulation of the common good as a basis for the 
systematic evaluation of social structures and customs so that people will be empowered to 
pursue the good.  This is accomplished through practical reasoning operating through prudence.   
The problem is that the freedoms, rights, and duties that have developed to support a 
contemporary pluralistic society have formed into a new constellation of issues that eclipse the 
common good and relegate its pursuit to subgroups or sects within society.  He declares, 
“Pluralism, by definition, means disagreement about what is finally true and good.  A pluralist 
society is one where people do not share an understanding of the full breadth and depth of the 
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good life.”170  In response to this pessimistic perspective upon the possibility of a contemporary 
and persuasive articulation of the common good Hollenbach first responds with an equally 
pessimistic query: “Will a culture in which tolerance is the prime virtue generate a society good 
enough to sustain its citizens over the long haul?”171  It is possible that the centrifugal effects that 
are implied in a pluralistic society inevitably rend asunder social unity, and that societies that 
make tolerance their primary virtue are doomed to collapse under the weight of their own 
inability to act in concert.  However, Hollenbach indicates his hopes with a more positive query.  
He wonders if commitment to the common good can be revitalized “without simultaneously 
encouraging conflicts like the religious wars” that elevated the virtue of tolerance in the first 
place.172  For this to be possible, the articulation of the common good would have to be 
simultaneously non-specific with regard to the issues in society about which there are the deepest 
disagreements, and robust enough to serve as a basis for social action, solidarity, and evolution.  
This is certainly a daunting task, however, the centripetal force of such an articulation, and even 
the process of articulating in common the picture of society we would like to have, is worth the 
effort.  One of the key aspects of this approach to ethics is that it moves some of the most 
divisive and volatile issues out of the domain of emotion and custom, and into the theoretical 
space of the intellect.  Hollenbach posits that it is only through intellectual solidarity that a 
common effort towards a persuasive vision of the common good can be attempted in a culturally 
diverse world.173 
 Hollenbach is particularly effective in presenting his case for a renewed dedication to a 
contemporary articulation of the common good because he does not leave his theory in the 
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abstract.  He attempts the kind of articulation he proposes.  Charged with the confidence that 
“any good of a person that is a real good, therefore, is embedded in the good of the community,” 
he outlines one version of what such a contemporary articulation would look like—or at least 
some of the characteristics that are likely to have broad appeal.174 
 After having made his case for the need of a contemporary articulation of the common 
good, Hollenbach provides the outline of such an articulation that can be universally recognized 
as good based on communal and self-interest.  He specifically incorporates a commitment to the 
radical equality that is proper to Christian ethics.  Hollenbach recognizes that iustitia is limited, 
and that it simply establishes a “floor below which social solidarity cannot fall without doing 
serious harm to some of society’s members.” He provides an articulation of the common good 
that includes such aspects as adequate housing, accessible jobs, quality education, child care, and 
health care.  Using wisdom, he then draws from the social doctrine of the Church and the 
spirituality of the Society of Jesus, and places social insertion and participation, based upon a 
preferential option for the poor, into the heart of his theory of justice.  He claims that social 
involvement serves as a basis of social justice because when a person encounters those who are 
in great need and do not have adequate access to resources, there is an expansion of interest such 
that citizens are moved “to use their agency not only for their own good but for the good of the 
community as well.”175  Social involvement produces awareness, and awareness produces action.  
He gives the example of the deliberate reduction or elimination of inner-city poverty.  He claims 
that a commitment to the reduction or elimination of inner city poverty should have universal 
traction, since it would produce effects that would be good for society, good for the assisted 
inner-city population, and good for the self-interest of all participants.  The reduction of inner-
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city poverty would contribute to the greater safety and peace of mind of all, and open up inner-
city resources to all.  This argument is quite compelling and Hollenbach successfully 
demonstrates how a contemporary articulation of the common good can be made, or at least how 
one goes about suggesting elements that should belong to such an articulation.  He advises that 
through persuasive, rational discourse a society can stimulate commitment to various elements of 
a vision of the common good.  And that consensus concerning even a small constellation of 
principles within the articulation of the common good simultaneously provides the criteria for 
evaluation according to prudence, frees the will to choose new possibilities through justice, and 
affords the energy necessary for concerted action.176 
Susanne DeCrane is another Catholic scholar that has produced a successful attempt to 
retrieve the Aristotelian/Thomistic synthesis based on a rearticulation of the common good.177  In 
her book Aquinas, Feminism, and the Common Good she appropriates the methods and structure 
of Aquinas, seeking to remain in his tradition, while requiring that the tradition live up to its 
emphasis on human equity and justice.  She accomplishes this by reinterpreting the concept of 
the common good according to contemporary values and the moral developments that have 
occurred since Thomas wrote.  Since Aquinas believed that the perfection of the soul is found in 
the good outside of the soul178 and that this good is the common good—which is ultimately 
God—the rehabilitation of the concept of the common good leads DeCrane to a rehabilitation of 
the perfection of the soul and an ultimate rehabilitation of Aquinas’s project of connecting the 
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soul to God through nature and grace.179  One of DeCrane’s primary interests is to make the 
necessary changes to the articulation of the common good such that women are empowered to 
engage in a manner that reflects the evolution in gender roles that has occurred through advances 
in technology, equal rights movements, and philosophical reflection.  She makes the necessary 
corrections to Aquinas’ anthropology so that his philosophical method and virtue theory might 
be employed in a manner that is consistent with liberation.  DeCrane states: 
Aquinas’s anthropology was foundational to his conception of goodness and justice, and 
it cannot be ignored because some significant aspects of it are now judged inaccurate.  
Passages in his writings regarding women that many today find offensive cannot simply 
be dismissed without examining them, and the larger context in which they occur, for 
elements that might be retrieved—shaken loose from their medieval anthropological 
context—and used in the development of a liberating Christian feminist social ethic.180   
 
The heart of her book consists of a retrieval of Aquinas’ virtue theory, and its concept of the 
common good.  She then partially repurposes the common good towards the liberation of women 
from oppressive social structures.  She accomplishes this through a systematic critique and 
refutation of the more controversial aspects of his anthropology.  DeCrane understands his 
anthropology to be the foundation for understanding the common good because she believes that 
his work is an exploration of the ideal relationship between the individual person and the 
community.  She believes that the common good is sustainable as an ethical principle “to the 
extent that it is based on a valid conception of the normatively human and of what, in principle, 
human flourishing requires.”181  She employs a feminist hermeneutical method to appropriate 
Aquinas’ conception of the common good in a manner that reflects contemporary convictions 
about relationships between the sexes.  She then provides an articulation of the common good 
that contains a balance of perspectives and includes needs and hopes from a female perspective.  
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Like Hollenbach, she provides an articulation of the common good that is persuasive, stable, and 
capable of supporting social critique and motivating social action.  They use wisdom to 
incorporate contemporary values into their articulation.  Both Hollenbach and DeCrane move 
past their articulation of the common good, according to theoretical reasoning operating under 
the power of wisdom, to a practical analysis of social structures and practices.  It is especially 
here that the power of social justice shines through—when the theoretical investigations become 
practical, social reflection becomes social action, and oppressive structures and customs are 
pulled down or transformed in the name of charity. 
4.4   Evaluating social structures according to prudence 
 
Practical reasoning is the process by which the means of attaining the goods associated 
with happiness are determined and presented to the will for choosing.  The human person has a 
natural aptitude for discerning the means and ends to which they are related by connaturality.  
This natural aptitude is normally sufficient to direct human behavior towards the good; however, 
practical reasoning is also concerned with applying the conclusions and conceptual articulations 
of theoretical reasoning to specific situations employing a critical mode.  Practical reasoning, 
when applied to the issues surrounding human flourishing, is responsible for ascertaining the 
means by which the ends, as articulated by theoretical reasoning, can best be achieved.  Since 
practical reasoning operates within the sphere of the “real world” of experience, finitude, and 
limitation, it deals with the human experience of inadequacy and the need for change, 
transformation, and growth.  Practical reasoning makes judgments about what sort of actions 
should be taken, according to the circumstances, towards the intended goal.  Again, since the 
human person is a social, embodied, and situated creature, the articulation of practical reasoning 
as applied to specific situations necessarily includes specific means of organizing and practically 
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living within the various human interpersonal relationships, relationships to various external 
goods, and other issues surrounding the human person.  While theoretical reasoning produces a 
description of what human flourishing and happiness look like, the means for moving towards 
the goal of happiness within the context of the common good are developed and presented 
through the exercise of practical reasoning assisted by prudence.  Therefore, the specific ways in 
which the common good can be expressed in laws and social structures, that is, how the universal 
principles contained in the theoretical presentation of human flourishing and the common good 
can be applied within a specific set of circumstances, is the domain of practical reasoning 
assisted by prudence.  Since one of the dominant features of social justice is the evaluation of 
social structures, laws, and customs, it is largely associated with the function of prudence.  When 
Aquinas is addressing the way that the virtues relate to the social order, to justice, and to the 
common good, he states: 
All things which belong to the moral virtues pertain to prudence, as to a director; hence it 
is that the right reason of prudence is contained within the definition of moral virtue, as 
was said above.  And therefore also the execution of justice, since it is ordained to the 
common good, which pertains to the office of the king, needs the direction of prudence.  
Hence these two virtues, that is to say, prudence and justice, are most proper to the 
king.182 
 
Although Aquinas attributes the fullness of the critical and constructive capacity of prudence to 
the monarch, when the polity of a society moves away from monarchy and towards democracy 
the primacy of prudence is extended to the general citizenry.  In a constitutional republic like the 
United States, the electorate shares many of the responsibilities of critical analysis and evaluation 
that Aquinas bequeaths the king, including the formation and assessment of laws.  For Aquinas, 
positive law is relativized by comparison to the divine law discernible through the use of reason 
towards a natural end.  Aquinas qualifies: 
                                                
182 ST, II-II, Q50, Art. 1, ad 1. 
Page 91 
Human law has the nature of law in so far as it partakes of right reason; and it is clear 
that, in this respect, it is derived from the eternal law.  But in so far as it deviates from 
reason, it is called an unjust law, and has the nature, not of law but of violence.183 
 
For positive law to be true law it must be governed by right reason operating with virtue.  This 
means that laws are open to the scrutiny of citizens according to prudence and wisdom.  
Although the individual agents are partially determined by their environment, the natural law 
theory allows for them to be simultaneously related to and interdependent upon their social 
situation, while having access to an external point of reference that provides a platform for 
rational judgment of the environment.  Prudence is the virtue by which the laws and structures of 
a society are compared and related to the ends associated with the common good, and ultimately 
found in God.  Aquinas’ virtue description gives sufficient theoretical support for the critique of 
social structures and laws.  The organic relationship between the agent and the existent social 
structure simultaneously provides an explanation for participation in structural sin, while 
endowing the agent with the critical skills and external points of reference necessary to stand in 
relative critical distance from partially determining structures.  Therefore, a contemporary 
appropriation of his virtue theory is especially equipped to engage in the critical reflection 
associated with social justice.  Aquinas’ ethics provide a natural platform from which to address 
issues like globalization, ecological care, unfair economic practices, and social sin.  In his article 
concerning social justice, its contemporary uses and abuses, Normand Paulhus declares: 
Social justice is not a magic formula out there somewhere, waiting to be applied 
automatically to concrete situations.  As a virtue it has a medium rationis, which means 
that its mode of action must be constantly determined by one’s reason.  Consequently, all 
appeals to the concept of social justice must be supported by cogent rational arguments 
that show why the common good requires such and such an act in these specific 
circumstances.184 
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Paulhus suggests that social justice is as flexible a concept as is the common good.  The goals 
and manner of operation of social justice will change and adapt as time goes by and societies 
evolve.   Social justice is a mode of ethical behavior in which a virtuous human person analyzes 
and critiques social conventions, institutions, customs, and laws according to a clear articulation 
of the common good, an apprehension of the final ends of humanity in God, and a set of 
prudential judgments concerning practical living.  The whole process must be carried out by 
virtuous individuals, who make use of cogent rational arguments that are accessible to others and 
shareable.  
 The programs of ethical reflection offered by both Hollenbach and DeCrane fit Paulhus’ 
requirements.  Hollenbach begins by making a case for the need for a clear articulation of the 
common good.  He then proceeds to attempt such an articulation by incorporating contemporary 
values into Aquinas’ account of the goods associated with flourishing within a community, 
including contemporary commitments such as radical equality and the preferential option for the 
poor.  Finally, he uses practical reasoning to apply the articulation of the common good to 
everyday situations.  Hollenbach suggests that his articulation of the common good impacts 
practical reasoning in analyzing welfare reform, establishing the interdependence of suburban 
life and urban life, and justifying moving from racial tolerance to solidarity.185 
 When DeCrane has finished employing a feminist hermeneutical method to appropriate 
Aquinas’ conception of the common good in a manner that reflects contemporary convictions 
about relationships between the sexes, includes female voices in what flourishing looks like, and 
explores issues like sexual fulfillment and health care as part of her picture of flourishing.  She 
then turns her attention to practical concerns and applications of her theoretical articulation. 
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While God is the ultimate common good of all creation, the common good is also 
understood by Aquinas as being connected to the practical exigencies of living in society.  
How we live in society, how we shape our societies and our relationships within 
societies, is related to the pursuit of God as the highest good.186 
 
She indicates that the exercise of hermeneutical retrieval produces “characteristics or hallmarks 
of the common good which may be used as tools of ethical assessment on any form of 
government and social reality.”187  She warns that such retrieval of the Thomistic conception of 
the common good does not automatically yield concrete or material norms, but that it yields a 
“sense of the construction and elements that contribute to justice that must now be concretized in 
a new situation.”188  At the end of her book, DeCrane applies her theoretical reflections to 
practical situations.  She analyzes various issues related to health care for women in the United 
States.  She uses a simple question to launch her analysis.  She asks how an analysis of the health 
care crisis in the United States would be affected by the use of the retrieved principle of the 
common good that she has developed in her book.189 
 Both DeCrane and Hollenbach implicitly demonstrate the process by which the issues of 
social justice relate to Aquinas’ virtue theory and the mapping schema I have presented.  They 
both begin by considering human flourishing using theoretical reasoning assisted by wisdom.  
Then they propose visions of the common good that are based in their concept of flourishing, 
rationally defended, and intended towards action.  They both shift into a practical mode in which 
they evaluate social structures and laws according to their conformity to the vision of the 
common good they have provided.  Finally, they make specific suggestions of action that can 
bring the laws and structures into greater conformity with advancement towards the common 
good.  It is clear that the majority of the intellectual effort associated with what we call social 
                                                
186 DeCrane, 60. 
187 Ibid., 59. 
188 Ibid., 59. 
189 Ibid., 127. 
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justice is done in the practical realm.  It is either involved in analyzing structures and laws 
according to the articulation of the common good, or it is applying this analysis to particular 
situations.  Therefore, the promotion of social justice largely belongs within the purview of 
prudence.  And the faith that does justice, inasmuch as it acts in the critical and constructive 
fashion of social justice, is more accurately a faith that acts prudently.   
This does not imply that the virtue of prudence acts in isolation.  The emphasis on the 
role of intellect in discerning the natural law is not meant to obscure the role of the affections, 
appetite, or will.  Prudence, the intellectual virtue by which the mind discerns moral truth, 
“presumes moral virtue as well, and it is important to remember the role of moral disposition—
the orientation of the will—in grasping the natural law.”190 Aquinas states that law “denotes a 
kind of plan directed towards an end.”191  This one sentence indicates the interdependence of the 
virtues and the manner in which social justice can be advanced.  Law is a plan directed towards 
an end.  This implies that the will must first be attracted by the proper end—which occurs 
through the virtues of charity and iustitia.  Then, using theoretical reasoning assisted by wisdom, 
the end must be understood with sufficient intellectual investigation to give an overall direction 
to practical reasoning.  Then, finally, practical reasoning, assisted by prudence, evaluates the 
possible means towards that end and presents these means to the will for final approval.  Social 
justice is not a policy or initiative that can be implemented.  It is not a specific economic or 
political theory.  It is the virtuous activity of the members of a community who engage their 
social situation in such a way as to order their actions towards the common good.  
 
 
 
                                                
190 See: McCarthy, 204, footnote 15.  In this footnote McCarthy suggests an essay by Kevin E. O’Reily, “The Vision 
of Virtue and Knowledge in the Natural Law of Thomas Aquinas,” Nova et Vetera 5, (2007), 41-46. 
191 ST, I-II, Q. 93, Art. 3, ad 2 
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CONCLUSION       
 
The commitment to social justice, along with its associated theological precept of the 
preferential option for the poor, is one of the most universally appealing aspects of the practical 
spirituality of the Society of Jesus.  However, in recent years I have seen a waning in enthusiasm 
among young Catholics, especially young Jesuits, concerning our commitment to social justice.  
For some the lack of enthusiasm extends from a suspicion of the Marxist philosophy that has 
become associated with it.  For others it stems from a nagging suspicion that there is a deep 
incompatibility or disjoint between the contemporary commitment to social justice and the other 
ethical commitments that extend from our traditional moral reasoning.  Therefore, the scheme of 
mapping the issues of social justice, and the preferential option, onto the virtue theory of 
Aquinas is important for several reasons.  First of all, if we allow Aquinas to define his own 
terms, and respect the limited manner in which iustitia operates within his system, then we can 
move past the frustration that comes from importing contemporary visions of justice into his 
virtue system.  For Aquinas iustitia is an essentially conservative virtue that acts upon the will to 
prompt the person to render unto another human person what they are due according to the 
existent social structure, the ius, which is its proper object.  The virtue of iustitia, on its own, 
simply does not possess a rational component capable of accomplishing the critical and 
constructive dimensions of social justice. 
Secondly, a contemporary appropriation that employs traditional moral reasoning, like 
virtue language and aspects of the natural law, while also making use of progressive convictions, 
like radical equality and the need for the critical evaluation of structures, can further broaden the 
appeal of the commitment to social justice by engaging the interests of people from all parts of 
the ideological spectrum.  Although the contemporary commitment to social justice has evolved 
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beyond a strict adherence to Aquinas’ theory, and it has assimilated sundry philosophical and 
political values, methods, and principles along the way, it remains deeply connected to the view 
of the human person expressed in Aquinas’ virtue theory.  Because of its embracive approach to 
human experience, the virtue structure of Aquinas is capable of supporting some elements of a 
Marxist critique of economic factors, a feminist critique of gender relations and distribution of 
power roles, and other contemporary critical features, while maintaining its deeply theological 
convictions and more traditional ethical principles.   
Thirdly, the mapping scheme I have proposed demonstrates how our contemporary 
convictions relate to Aquinas’ theory as a whole.  The commitment to social justice lights up 
with greater intelligibility when it is placed in proximity to Aquinas’ full theory.  The frustrations 
associated with trying to use iustitia as a theoretical basis for contemporary justice, and 
especially social justice, are obviated when one examines the overall virtue structure provided by 
Aquinas—with special attention to the inversion Aquinas made with respect to the order of the 
virtues.  For Aquinas, as opposed to Aristotle, iustitia is not the first virtue that connects human 
agents.  Before iustitia is introduced, in Aquinas’ system, the standard for ethical treatment, and 
the nature of social interactions, has already been established through charity and wisdom.  
Using the high bar of charity, the domestic relationships that seem to have an anemic treatment 
in Aquinas’ section of iustitia can be understood, and the preferential option for the poor 
becomes intelligible.  Additionally, the contemporary commitment to radical equality can be 
appropriated through the use of wisdom in the articulation of the common good.  In this way, the 
focus moves away from a narrow concentration on justice and towards a broader consideration of 
interactive human virtues.  In this view, ethical reasoning, including the issues of social justice, 
is situated within the context of the virtuous activity of the members of a community who engage 
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their social situation in such a way as to order their actions towards the common good.  The 
comprehensive treatment of human virtues can have a more inclusive appeal since each of the 
virtues will resonate differently with individuals of differing ideological commitments. 
Fourthly, beyond the seemingly purely semantic issues related to the taxonomy of the 
virtues, this thesis has demonstrated how it is that social justice grew organically out of the 
natural law and virtue theory of Aquinas.  This historical fact not only indicates the high degree 
of compatibility between the theoretical structure of Aquinas’ virtue theory and the issues 
commonly referred to as social justice, but it also points to the fact that the continued 
appropriation of his ethical theory may serve to reduce some of the tensions surrounding the 
commitment to and implementation of social justice.  Aquinas’ ethical system treats the actions 
of human agents within their full context.  Each virtue is grounded in his theoretical psychology.  
At the same time, the will and intellect of the agent is acted upon by external realities.  Wisdom 
and synderesis assist the intellect in its investigation of the goods necessary for human 
flourishing.  Through the investigation of human nature, as presented through experience, the 
intellect is able to form an image of what human flourishing looks like, and thereby to appoint 
the end to the moral virtues—the goal towards which all moral actions should be moving through 
the action of the will.   
Iustitia and charity assist the will in its orientation towards relative and absolute goods.  
Aquinas’ theory of the will is able to mediate the connection between iustitia and the common 
good in a manner that strengthens and defines both the internal disposition and its connection to 
the external reality of the social order.  The organic relationship between the agent and the 
existent social structure provides a theoretical framework by which structural sin can be 
understood and analyzed.  Aquinas’ virtue theory, considered as a whole, endows the agent with 
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the critical skills and external points of reference necessary to stand in relative critical distance 
from the partially determining structures of external realities, while taking seriously their 
influence upon the agent.  Therefore, a contemporary appropriation of his virtue theory is 
especially equipped to engage in the critical reflection associated with social justice.   
Fifth and finally, since Aquinas emphasizes the deeply rational and social nature of 
human virtue, a contemporary appropriation of his ethical theory would require that rational 
dialogue be the primary mode of ethical reasoning.  In Aquinas’ system, the person is presented 
with the goal of social action that is defined by a conceptualization of human flourishing and the 
common good through the use of theoretical reasoning assisted by wisdom.  The means of 
arriving at that goal are proposed by practical reason operating under the influence of prudence.  
Then the person chooses to enact these means using their will that has a stable disposition of 
acting towards the common good.  Because wisdom and prudence play such a critical role in 
Aquinas’ ethics, a contemporary appropriation of his ethical theory naturally promotes rational 
dialogue as the primary means addressing the issues related to social justice and provides a 
structure that connects the good of the agent to the good of the community.  Therefore, the 
pursuit of a more fair and just society, a society that more perfectly reflects the kingdom of God, 
is best accomplished through exchanging persuasive articulations of the common good, and 
through the subsequent presentation of effective means to achieve that good.  Thomas Aquinas 
was a master of dialogue.  In creating his masterful synthesis of faith and reason he employed 
Christian revelation, Greek philosophy, Jewish insights, Islamic sources, and differing 
viewpoints with the utmost respect.  Beyond the specific content that his philosophical system 
provides us, in the dialogical nature of Thomas Aquinas we have an example to guide us in our 
contemporary struggle to bring our faith to bear on the issues of today.
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